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Record No. 3070 
J~ WELLFORD SMITH, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY 
OF DOLLY C. SMITH, .ALSO KNOWN AS MRS .. 
MIKE A. SMITH, INDIVlDtJALLY, AND TRADING 
.AS RAINBOW GRILL AND .ALSO AS SQUIRE 
GRILL, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
ARLINGTON AMUSEMENt.r CORPORATION, A. VlR,. 
GINIA CORPORATION, Defendant in Error, 
PETI'r'ION FOR WRIT OF ERROR-
To the Honorable the Chief Justice anid the Justices of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal,s of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, J. Wellford Smith, Trustee in Bankruptcy 
of Dolly C. Smith, also known as Mrs. Mike A. Smith, indi-
vidually, an:d trading as 'Rainbow Grill and also as Squire 
Grill, respectfully represents unto Your Honors that he is 
· aggrieved by a final judgment of the Law and Equity Court 
of the City 0£ Richmond, Part II, ior the defendant herein 
entered on the 14th day of August, 1945, in a certain action 
at law then pending in said Court, wherein J. Wellford Smith, 
'l'rustee, etc., was the plaintiff and the Arlington Amusement 
Corporation was the defendant. The record in this .case 
2• 'is appended hereto *as a part of this petition. 
In this case, your petitioner entered s-q.it against the 
defendant for the purpose of avoiding a preferential payment 
under the terms of the Bankruptcy Act. The case was tried 
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in the Law and Equity Court of -the City of Richmond, Part 
II, on July 13, 1~45, and all matters of law and fact being 
submitted to the Court wit.bout intervention of a jury, judg-
ment for the defendant was entered on the 17th of August, 
1945. - . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
-- -
Following are the facts of the case, as to which there is no 
dispute:. 
This js a s.uit by the Trustee in Bankruptcy of Dolly C. 
Smith, also,.Jmown as Mrs. Mike A. Smith, individually, and 
trading as- Rainbow Grill and also as Squire Grill (herein-
after known as petitioner) against the Arlington Amusement 
Corporation (hereinafter known as defendant) to avoid a 
preference under the authority of Section 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act (11 U.S. C. A.~ Sec. 96). The bankrupt had leased 
certain premises and equipment of the defendant where she 
conducted a restaurant business known as the '' Squire Grill''. 
On January 10, 1945, bankrupt and defendant united in a 
contract selling the entire business and equipment, fixtures, 
etc., to a third party. On the same day, ·bankrupt and de-
fendant entered .into a written agreement between them-
selves, the effect of which was that out of the total purchase 
price of $8,500.00 received for the business, *defendant 
3• was to hold $2,500.00 for the account of the bankrupt, out 
of which it was to liquidate in full the indebtedness of 
the bankrupt to itself, and the rest of the $2,500.00 was to be 
used to pay the claim of snch of the other creditors of the 
bankrupt as should present their. claims within sixty days. If 
any part of this fund remained unpaid, it was to be turned 
over to the bankrupt. · 
This ag·reement is in evidence as plaintiff's· "Exhibit A" 
filed with the notice of motion and is hereinafter set forth· in 
full 
On J annary 17th defendant received the $2,500.00 as pro-
vi9ed by the agreement, and on the same day paid itself the 
sum of $1,343.92 in full of its claim against the bankrupt (M. 
R., p.19). A:µ item of-$67.70 was paid to an outside creditor. 
On :M:arch 11th an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was 
:filed against the bankrupt, and on April 9th she was -adjudi-
cated a bankrupt by the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, and on May 4th the plaintiff 
qualified as Trustee in Bankruptcy. This suit followed.· 
On May 27th defendant turned over to petitioner the sum 
of $1,088.38 out of the original $2,500.00 to be administered 
iri the bankruptcy court as assets for the benefit of creditors. 
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QUESTIONS INVOLVED. 
This suit was broug·ht under the provisions of Section 60 
of the National Bankruptcy Act. The applicable *por-
4 • tion of this Act reads as follows : 
"Sec. 60. Preferred·Creditors.-a. A preference is a trans-
fer, as defined in this Act, of any of the property of a debtor 
to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an 
antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while in-
solvent and within four months before the :filing by or against 
him of the petition in bankruptcy, or of the original petition 
under Chapter X, XI, XII or XIII of this Act, the effect of 
which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a 
greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the 
same class. * * ·* 
"b. Any such preference may be avoided by the trµstee if 
the creditor receiving· it or to be benefited thereby or his agent 
acting with reference thereto has, at the time when the trans-
fer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is in-
solvent. * * * " 
It thus appears that there are five elements that must con-
cur before a preferential payment may be avoided. As set 
forth in ·abbreviated form of Remington on Bankruptcy, 5th 
Ed., Vol. 4A, Sec. 1657, these are as follows: (1) A transfer 
on an antecedent debt; (2) a transfer made by an insolvent 
debtor; (3) a transfer made within four months before bank-
ruptcy; ( 4) a transfer resulting in an advantage to a c.reditor; 
(5) reasonable cause fo-.r creditor to believe the debtor is in-
solvent. 
Here it is conceded that the fir$t three elements are present 
It is only as to tl1e last two that there is any dispute. The 
questions involved in this suit are, therefore, as follows: 
(1) Did the transaction in this case result in an advantag·e 
to the defendant over other creditors f . · 
. (2) At the time. of such payme11t did the defendant have 
reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent 1 
5* *The lower court based its decision in this case en-
tirely -on the :first question above, holding that the trans-
action did not result in an advantage to the defendant over 
other creditors of the bankrupt. The court announced its de-
cision in a letter to counsel, which was subsequently made n 
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part of the record (M. R., p. 14). The court in this letter 
said: 
''Gentlemen: 
"I have carefully considered the evidence and the argu-
ments and briefs of counsel. 
· ''Viewing all of the evidence relating to the sale of Squire 
Grill and the disposition of the proceeds, I am of the opinion 
that no preference was created within the purview of the 
Bankruptcy A.ct. Considering the transaction in its entirety, 
no creditor of Mrs. Smith has been deprived of his fair share 
in her estate. Her estate was in no way diminished thereby, 
but on the other hand was augmented to the extent of more 
than a $1,000.00 and the creditors were further benefited by 
the elimination of the defendant's claim of about $1,400.00 
from a share in the augmented estate. 
'' An order may be presented showing the submission of 
all questions of law and fact to the Court, the Court's· finding, 
and dismissing the case from the docket. 
''Yours very truly,'' 
In regard to the second question, which was not decided 
_by the lower court, the position of petitioner is that as a 
matter of law, the evidence was that defendant knew of bank-
rupt's insolvency at the time of the preferential transfer. If, 
therefore, this Honorable Court should find for petitioner 
on Question No. 1 under Section 6365 of the Virginia .Code, 
it can also find for petitioner on Questions No. 2 as well and 
enter :final judgment for the petitioner *without further 
6* pro·ceedings in the lower court. · 
The questions involved in this appeal will be discussed 
in the order stated. 
Did the Transaction in This Case Resitlt in An .Advantage to 
the Defendant Over Other Creditors? 
At the outset it should be noted that the issue here involved 
is one of law. There is no dispute as to the facts which are 
admitted. These ·are as follows: 
~ankrupt had been operating this restaurant business 
· known as the '' Squire Grill'' for two years. Toward the end 
of the ~econd year, she had become delinquent~ in her rent 
(M. R., p. 44). It was then that the subject of the sale of 
the business was broached. On this point it seems that the 
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bankrupt herself was making an effort to find a purchaser 
(M. R., pp. 46, 47). Defendant told her that if she sold the 
business for as much as $8,000.00, they would '' give her a 
-credit of $2,000.00 above what she owed us at the time'~ (M .. 
R., p. 49). 
However, the business was :finally sold to parties who dealt 
directly with defendant for $8,500.00. Defendant requested 
bankrupt to unite in the instruments of sale_ and then she 
"' asked about the credit which she was to get, she still main-
tained she could sell to her purchaser if she be given a little 
more time'' {M. R., p. 49). · . . 
Then, evidently to secure her signature to the sale instru-
·ment, ''Mr. Thalhimer agreed that he would go ahead and 
7* •give her the $2,000.00 credit. She said, well, we.· were 
getting $8,500.00, why couldn't she have the extra $500.00 
.as that would pay out everything she owed including what 
she owed to Arlington Amusement Corporation. Mr. Thal-
himer, out of the goodness of his heart, just told her that he 
would give her the $2,500.00 credit if that would pay her 
out. • • • " 
Then followed the execution of the agreement ·of ·January 
10, 1945, which is herewith set out in full for the convenience 
of the Court: 
"Mrs. D. S. Smith 
''Richmond 
''Virgi~ia 
"' Dear Mrs. Smith: 
:I 
'' Richmond, Virginia 
"January 10, 1945 
"We are this day agreeing to sell to Messrs. Foster, aU 
:fixtures, equipment, dishes, pots and pans, cooking utensils, 
silver, china, and glassware and all other articles, except sup-
plies at the SQUIRE Restaurant, No. 305-307 North Sixth 
Street, Richmond, Virginia. · · 
''It is agreed between you and the undersigned as follows! 
''1. Out of the proceeds of this money, when received by 
us,. we will retain the sum of $2,500.00 for your account, for a 
period of sixty days, provided tha,t out of said sum, there is 
to be appropriated and used: First, so much as necessary to 
pay the amounts of rent unpaid by you on the restaurant and 
on 408% North 8th Street; and Second, so much further as 
necessary to pay the amounts of all bills for merchandise 
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a~d services that you owe in connection with the operation 
of the SQUffiE Restaurant. 
'' 2. Any part of the $2,500.00. not needed for payments 
mentioned in paragraph 1 is to be paid to you at the expira-
tion of said sixty ( 60) days. 
'' 3 .. · If the rent, merchandise and service debts mentioned 
in p_aragraph 1 are in excess of $2,500.00, yon are to pay the 
excess of . said debts.. . 
"4!' :You· 'Will give possession of this restaurant, together 
with ·all equipment, dishes, pots and pans, cooking .uten-
8* sils1 *silver, china and glassware, and all other articles 
e~cept supplies, to the 11ew purchaser on or before J anu-
ary 15, 1945, and your rent will stop as of the day you give 
possession, and the purchaser will start to pay rent as of that 
date. 
'' Very trnly yours, . 
''ARLINGTON AMUSEMENT CORPORATION 
''By ....................... ·- ......................... . 
''ACCEPTED: 
" 
Petitioner maintained at the trial of this matter that evi-
dence of the negotiations between bankrupt and the def end-
ant leading up to the agreement between them of January 
loth was improper, since it was all merged in the agreement, 
which, of course, speaks for itself. We assert now that the 
· legal effect of this agreement is to set aside the sum of 
$2,500.00 out of the purchase price of the restaurant as the 
absolute property of the bankrupt, . out of which certain of 
her debts, including that of defendant, were to be paid. 
In this connection, petitioner's position is as follows: The 
evidertce sliows bankrupt did have an interest in the busi-
. ness susceptible of sale, and that even if she did uot, the 
effect of the agreement of January 10th was to make $2,500:00 
her own property to such an extent _that wpen clef endant paid 
itself the sum of $1,343.92 therefrom, this amounted to a 
preference within t~e purview of the Bankruptcy Act. 
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ARGUMENT.· 
In Remington on Bankruptcy, 5th Ed. (1943), Vol. 4A, 
9i11= *Sec. 1657, this element of a preferential payment is de-
fined as follows: 
''4th Element: A transfer resulting in an advantage to a 
creditor. 'A transfer * * ~ the effect of which * * ~ will be to 
- enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his 
debt than some other creditor of the same class.' Subdivision 
(a), Sec. 60, 11 U. 8. C. A., Sec. 96.'; 
In Section 1 (30) of the Bankruptcy Act, the word "trans-:-· 
fer'' is defined as follows: 
'' ( 30) 'Tran sf er' shall include the sale and every other and 
different mode, direct or indirect, of disposing of· or of part-
ing with property or with an interest therein or with the pos-
session thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an 
interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or in-
voluntarily, by or without judicial proceeq.ings, as a convey-
ance, s1:1le, assignment, payment, pledge, mortgage, lien, en-
cumbrance, gift, security or otherwise;'' 
At trial of this case the lower court expressed dotibt that 
there had been any transfer of the debtor's property-any-
thing of value belonging to the bankrupt's estate. It should 
be noted that th~ "transfer,., in this case was not the written 
contract of January 10th of the defendant and the bankrupt 
to sell this business to the prospective purchasers. This con-
tract merely provided the fund out of which· the pref eren-
tial transfer later took place. It set up the fund of $2,500.00, 
which was the. exolusiva property of the bankrupt. · 
. The ~'transfer'' consisted of the payment to the def end-
ant of the sum of $1,343.~2 on January 17th, whereby it, the 
Arlington Amusement Corporation, received, out of the 
$2,500.00 belonging to the bankrupt, payment in full of its 
debt, so that today it has been paid in full, while the other 
creditors- of the same class have only a hope to receive 
10* *a small dividend out of the bankrupt's estafe. · 
In reg~rd to the question as to whether or not the 
bankrupt had any property interest in the Squire Grill-which 
she could dispose -0f, tlie facts are that she was the owner of 
the business in that she owned the licenses and the g·ood will, 
and on the date of sale (Januai·y 10th) she made delivery as · 
a going concern. Surely these items were. worth something, 
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else the defendant would never have agreed to pay bankrupt 
$2,500.00 for them. It is apparent froJ?,i the evidence of de-
fendant's own. witness, Wood, who was secretary-treasurQl· 
of the defendant corporation, that during the negotiatiom 
leading up to sale of this business defendant believed that 
bankrupt had a definite interest in the business, else why 
sb:ould rt have insisted that bankrupt unite in executing the 
instruments of sale? (These agreements are in evidence as 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 (M. R., p. 19).) If bankrupt had 
no interest in the business susceptible of sale, then why was 
it. that Mr. Thalhimer, who was acting for the defendant, in-
sisted that Mrs. Smith enter into the agreement of sale Y The 
· evidence on this point is found on page 49 of the Manuscript 
Record, where defendant's witness, Wood, testified as fol-
lows: 
"Well, she didn!t get her purchaser and after we made 
the ag·reement with the Foster boys Mr. Thalhimer called 
Mrs. Smith in and asked ]J.er to enter into the agreement to 
sell · to them. '' 
The fact is implicit throughout the evidence of the witness, 
Wood, that defendant recognized that it was necessary to 
secure bankrupt's signature to the agreement of sale and thus 
rceognized :her interest in the business. . 
11 * ~Be that as it may, the fa_ct remains that on the very 
day of the transaction, bankrupt and defendant sat down 
and came to a written ag-reement that bankrupt's interest in 
the business was worth $2,500.00. This having been agreed 
to between the parties themselves, how can we now say that 
bankrupt's interest in the business she had built up over a 
period of two years' operation was of no value Y 
Furthermore, it is clear that in selling this. business as n 
going concern, bankrupt was disposing of a valuable prop-
erty right. On this point the case of C. <t P. Telephone Co. v. 
Commowwealth of Virginia, 147 Va. 43, is enlightening. Mr. 
Justice Prentis sai4 (pages 62, 63): 
"(18) In Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 
U: S. 165,' 39 S. Ct. 815, 59 L. Ed. 1244, the _Supreme Court 
of the United States says: 'That there is an element of value 
in an assembled and established plant, doing business and 
earning money, over one not thus advanced, is self-evident. 
.This element of value is a property right and should be con-
. sidered in determining the value of the property 1upon which 
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the owner has a right to make a .fair ·return when the same 
.is privately owned, although dedicated to public use.' '' 
There is another _;possible view that· may he ·taken of the 
:facts, ho.wever, on the basis of the evidence of Mr .. Wood, sec~ 
retary-b·easurer of the defendant corporation.. It is. plain 
from the evidence · of this witness that the bankrupt thought 
:she was entitled to share in the proceeds of the sale as a re-
turn for her efforts in trying to find~ a purchaser.. · 
Accordingly, _it may well be that when defendant and tbe 
l>ankrupt reached an agreement that $2,500.00 was to be con-
. :sidered as the property of the bankrupt, they may have hacl 
in mind that she had earned. this amount in connection 
12* *with the negotiations lea.ding up to the sale. Or, what 
is more likely, they probably agreed to set this figure 
as payment to bankrupt not only for her efforts in the sale, 
but also for all of her interest in the business itself. 
Be that as it may, plaintiff earnestly contends that whether 
bankrupt had any interest in the business susceptible of sale 
is immaterial because it is- conceded that as a result of the 
sale, a fund was created in which she had an interest to the 
extent of $~,500.00, and this by an express. written agreement 
,of the parties. We are, the ref ore, not concerned with how 
this fund came into being. If it had been an outright gift; it 
would have been no less the property of the bankrupt. 
Illustrative of this principle, counsel has been able to :fh1d 
the following cases: · 
In Stearns Salt and Lumber Co. v. Hammond, 217 Fed. 559, 
under the terms of a mortgage, the mortgagor insured cer-
tain mortgaged property, the policies being payable to the· 
trustee under the mortgage. There was a loss, and under the 
terms of the policy the proceeds became the property of the 
mortgagee (creditor) and the court so held. Nevertheless, 
the mortgagee voluntarily relinquished its prior clai'.µl to these 
funds in favor of the mortgagor (debtor-bankrupt) with the 
understanding that the money was to be paid over to the. 
creditor to be applied on .an unsecured claim. • 
In a suit to avoid this payment ·as preferential, the defense 
was made that the money never did belong to the *bank-
13* rupt and so the payment did not deplete his estate. The 
court held, however, that by its voluntary act, the credi-
tor has surrendered the fund to the debtor, and the subse .. 
quent payment was pref erentia.l. The court said: 
'' To say the least it was entirely competent for the lum-
:HJ Supreme· Oourt of AppeafR of. Virginia 
her company (.creditor) to waive its claim to the insurance 
money t:ind to surrender it to the .mortgagor (bankrupt) mak-
ing it the latter's property; and this, we think, it practically 
and effectually did by the course taken and as effectively a~ 
if the. mon:ey had first. been paid over to the mortgagor and 
afterwar~,p~id to th~ lumber company. Circuity of arrange-
ment will not alter the force of l'lis transaction, preferential 
in fact. · Nef!!port Ba'ltk v .. Herkimer Bank,. 225 U. S. 178,. 
184; 32 ~- :Ct. 633 ; 56 L. E~. 1042.'' 
In Schuetz v. Infernation.al Harvester Co., '149 N .. W. 855, 
Headnote· No .. 1 states as follows: 
"Where a creditor, to whom a deotor whose sfooir has been 
destroyed by fire had given an order upon the insurance com-
pany prior to the creditor"s mortgage or debtor's insolvency,. 
joined in an agreement with other creditors to apportion the 
insurance among· them so as to avoid bankruptcy proceedingsr 
if possible, the creditor thereby waived his claim under the 
order and there is no def'ense to an action by a trustee in 
bankruptcy to recover the ampunt received by the creditor; a 
waiver bemg an intentional relinquishment of' a lrnown right 
and requiring no condition or arrapgement of prejudice to 
others to support it.'' · 
In the case of In Re Frazer, 221 Fed. 83, a party who was 
not liable on the firm's notes endorsed its notes given in re-
newal of _an oblig~tion at the request of the payee, the firm 
b.eing insolvent and the payee having reasonable cause to be-
lieve that a preference would be effected. Held, the· endorse-
ment gave the payee a preference, the partners' individual 
estate being sufficient to pay all individual debts. 
. The case of In Re Mayo Oontraoting Co., 157 Fed. 469r 
14* *is somewhat similar on the facts. Headnote No. 2 
stat~s the holding of the case to be as follows: 
'' The fact that a bankrupt was insolvent at the time it en-
tered into a contract, and that through such contract it at-
tained property on credit from time to t.ime prior to its bank-
ruptcy, does not prevent a partial payment made by it on 
such property within four months prior to its bankruptcy 
from being a preference where no more property was fur-
nished by the creditor after such payment.'' 
These cases illustrate the principle that the Court is not 
concerned with the source of the fund or the property out 
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of which the preferential payment is made. Its only concern 
is whether or not it was in fact the property of the bankrupt 
at the time of the preferential transfer. 
In this connection the Court's attention is directed to the 
fact that defendant admits in its grounds of defense filed 
herein that the bankrupt did have an interest in this fund of 
$2,500.00. -Paragraph 9 thereof, after denying a '' specific in-
terest", says: 
'' • * • and that if it can be said she did have an interest 
it was contingent only as set forth in the contract, copy of 
which is attached to said notice of motion;" 
It is, therefore, conceded at. least by implication that the 
bankrupt did l1ave at least a "contingent" interest in this 
fund, and contingent interests in property are clearly included 
in the statutory definition of the word ''transfer" as cited 
herein before. 
Turning for the moment to the precise language of the 
agreement of tT anuary 10th between defendant and bankrupt. 
we. fail to appreciate how it is possible to read this 
15"" contract *and not conclude that its- legal effect was to 
create a fund of-$2,500.00 which was to be the property 
of the bankrupt. The only limitation placed upon its use was 
that it was to be paid out for certain designated pu;11>oses. 
But it distinctly provides that if any of the fund is left mtact 
after sixty days, it will be paid to the bankrupt. Does not this 
prove that the whole fund was considered to be the property 
of the bankrupt? Let us turn for a moment to the question 
of how to" determine what sort ·of pi:operty right may be the 
subject of a transfer under the Bankruptcy Act. The rule is 
thus stated in Collier on Bankruptcy, Vo]. 1, page 96, where, 
in speaking of the term "transfer'', this is said: 
"It was only intended to apply to cases where from the 
nature of the contract the title to the property later trans-
ferred has become vested in the bankrupt to such an extent 
as to render it his property and as such liable to the payment 
of his debts." 
And in the case of Pirie v. Chicago Title Company, 182 U. 
S. 4_38, 45 L. Eel. 1171, at 1176, this is saicl: 
.. 
"The words 'transfer any•Qf his property' include the giv-
ing or conveying anything ofvalne-anytbing which has debt 
paying or debt securing power." 
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Another statement of this rule is found in the case of Stern, 
Falk and Conipa;n,y v. Lo-uisville Trust Company, C. C. A., 6th 
Cir., 112 Fed. 501, where the court said that the word ''prefer-
ence'' was not in set terms defined by the Bankruptcy Act, 
but "* * * we have no doubt that so far as the nature of 
the property transferred is concerned it includes everything 
which has capacity for being taken and appropriated to the 
satisfaction of debts provable under the Act". 
16f.= *We see from the above that the test to be applied to 
determine whether the property transferred is such as 
is covered by the Bankruptcy Act is whether it has debt pay-
ing power. If it can be used to pay bankrupt's debts, then it 
is his property within the meaning· of the Act. 
Applying this test to the instant case, we find that these 
parties expressly contracted to use the fund of $2,500.00 tn 
do this very thing, viz., to pay bankrupt's debts. In execution 
of· the ag-reement, the defendant paid a claim of $67.70 to 
an outside creditor, paid itself the sum of $1,343.92 and the11 
after bankruptcy ensued, surrendered the balance of the fund, 
namely, $1,088.38 to the plaintiff to be used for the benefit 
of bankrupt's other creditors. How can it possibly be said 
then ~hat this fund, out of which this preferential payment 
of $1,343.92 was made on January 17th, was in fact not the 
property of the bankrupt? Did she have a lesser interest, or 
a different kind of interest in the $1,343.92 paid the defend-
ant than she had in the $1,088.38 later paid to her trustee in 
bankruptcy 7 
For purposes of argument, let us suppose that bankruptcy 
had ensued between January 10th, the date on w~ich the agree-
ment between bankrupt and defendant to appropriate $2,500.00 
to any payment of her debts, was reached, and January 17th, 
the date when the purchase money was actually paid and de-
fendant appropriated $1,343.92 to liquidate· its own debt in 
full. Is there any doubt that the whole fund of $2,500.00 
would have become the property of the Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy instead of only the excess over and above the amount 
of defendant's debt? 
'"'Looking at the wl1ole transaction in perspective, it 
17* seems clear that a preference has. resulted. The test to 
be applied is whethe;r as of the date when bankruptcy 
resulted the situation is such that the preferred creditor has 
received a larger share .of its claim than the other creditors. 
The rule in this respect is succinctly stated in the case of 
Stern v. Louisville Tru.st Co., 112 Fed. 501, where it is said: 
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· '' In respect to the means by which the tr.ansf er is effected) 
there is no limitation. How.ever devious the method., if the 
result is that, but for the Act, the creditor acquires property 
from the debtor which is subject at law or in equity to be 
appropriated to the satisfaction of the debtor's obligations, 
that is a transfer within the meaning of the. law .. " 
Circuity of operations will not help creditor to hang onto 
its pre'.fer~nce. An enlightening case has been found that 
bears some similarity to the instant one on the facts. 
In the case of Im Re Sha:titz mid Son Co., 205 Fed. 425, the 
president of an insolvent corporation conceived a plan of 
selling a pai·t of its machinery to a new company so that the 
business might continue in ca.se the bankrupt was forced to 
suspend, the scheme being to induce various creditors to pro-
vide funds with which to buy the machinery and to require 
them to pay their subscriptions only in case their debts 
against the bankrupt. were fully satisfied. The plan was ap:! 
proved by tbe creditors on the promise, viz.: They were to 
subscribe to the purchase price of the machinery only if their 
debt against the bankrupt was fully satisfied.. The plan was 
executed, and when bankruptcy resul~ed, they sought to en-
force a lien against the. fund realized by the bankrupt's trus· 
te·e on a sale of the machinery. It has held that the 
1s• 8 _scheme amounted to a preference and was, therefore, 
unenforceable. The court said (page 427): 
'' The general scheme, as shown by the evidence-, was to 
induce various creditors of the company to provide funds 
with which to buy .such machinery, and require them to pay 
their subscriptions only in case their debts against the com .. · 
pany were fully satisfied, the agreement specifically provid· 
ing that the subscribers were to buy the machinery ·only in 
case a sum equal to their subscriptions were first paid to 
them. This scheme appears so palpably to favor the cred-
itors in question that the presumption at once arises that all 
the parties had reasonable cause to believe that they were 
receiving a preference over other general creditors. There-
£ ore, the important question is whether at the time of the 
alleged payments to Knoll, Shack and Grubs, the petitioning 
creditors, they had reasonable cause to believe that in case of 
bankruptcy a preference in their favor would result from 
the subscription agreement. To enable them to enforce a 
lien against the fund realized in the bankruptcy court on the 
sale of the machinery would obviously give them an ad· 
vantage over the general ~reditors. Their claims, save those 
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as to wages earned within three months immediately before 
the bankruptcy proceedings were instituted, were not entitled 
to priority of payment. It is consequently difficult to avoid 
the ·conclusion that the plan attempted by the bankrupt com-
pany was a device to give certain creditors a preference over· 
other creditors of the same class and that the petitioning 
creditors:_ were aware of such intention.'' 
In the case at bar, just as in that cited, the conditi<m upon 
which the whole scheme hinged was that the preferred cred-
itor was to be p~d in full, and this being true, the entire trans-
action amonrited to ·a preference since its prime motive· was 
to assure an advantage to the preferred creditor over all of 
the others. 
It is, therefore,. earnestly contended that the action of the 
lower court in holding that the entire fund of $2,500.00 as 
provided by the agreement of Janua1·y 10th was not the-
property of the bankrupt and that payment *therefrom 
19* of defendant's debt did not amount to a preference, con-
stituted error justifying a reversal by this Court and the 
entry of fi:qal judgment for the plaintiff. It is plain that the 
result of this transaction finds the defendant having received 
all of its claim against the bankrupt to the detriment of other 
creditors of the same class. 
At the Time of Bitch Payment Did the Defendant HalfJe Rea-
sonable Cause to Believe the Debtor Insolvent? 
As hereinbefore stated, the lower court did not allude to 
this question in its decision in this cas~. Counsel for the 
. plaintiff interprets .this action as virtual admissiOB by the 
court that if it had been necessary to answer this question., 
its answer would have been in favor of the plaintiff.. At any 
rate, we respectfully assert now that as a matter of law, based 
on the evidence, plaintiff is entitled to-have this question de-
cided in its favor by this Honorable Court. 
The actual date of the preferential payment in this case to 
defendant was January 17, 1945 .. This is shown by the state-
ment of account rendered plaintiff by the defendant when in 
May, after bankruptcy had ensued and the Trustee had made 
demand upon tbe defendant, in response to this demand de-
fendant paid plaintiff the sum of $1,088.38, being the remain-
der of the original fund of $2,500.00. Accompanying this pay-
ment, defendant furnished the plaintiff with a statement of 
account, the original of which is in evidence in this case as 
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'~Plaintiff's Exhibit 3" (M. R., p. 19). This statement 
20* -0f account show~ that ,x,defendant received this pref-
erential payment on January 17th. This was acquiesced 
in by defendant at trial of this case. 
Before entering into a discussion of the facts as set out 
in the evidence, it should be noted that act1tal knowlerlge of 
insolveµcy on the part of the d~fendant is not necessary. It 
is simply necessary to· show that the defendant had knowl-
edge of facts which would put the ordinarily intelligent busi-
ness man upon inquiry,, which inquiry would have disclosed 
a condition of insolvency. 
It is also appropriate to notice at this point that the Bank-. 
ruptcy Act of 1938 ( Chandler Act, is different in this respect 
from the Act of 1910 in that the former law provided that 
knowledge should be ·brought home to the creditor that he 
was receiving a preference. The Act of 1938 simply directs 
the inquiry to the fact of insolvency. 
A clear and concise statement of the rule is found in the 
case of lVilliam..c; v. Plattner, 46 Fed. (2d) 467: 
'' 'The rule to be deduced from all these decisions is 
· whether the facts surrounding and attending· the transfer 
·alleged to be voidable was such as to cause a reasonably pru-
dent man to believe that the bankrupt was insolvent when it 
was made, or were such as to put him on inquiry touching the 
insolvency of the debtor, which inquiry would have disclosed 
insolvency.' 
''It was also said In Re Clark (D. C.), 11 Fed. (2d) 540: 
"'It has been repea.tedly pointed out by the authorities 
that it is not necessarv that the nreferred creditor shall have 
had actual knowledg·e, "'either of insolvency or that the affect of 
the transfer would be to effect ·a preference. It fa sufficient 
to prove that the circumstances taken together were such as 
would naturally ha:v:e led an ordinarily businessman to the true 
belief as to debtor's actual condition, ·and as to the effect 
of the transfer. The test is: ,Vhat inference *would 
21 * the ordinarily intelligent businessman draw from the 
facts?' " 
Another excellent statement of the principle involved is 
found in the case of Canrigh.t v. The General F~nance Corp., 
(1940), 35 Fed. ~upp. 841 at 843, 844: 
"A voidable preference under the bankruptcy act, 11 U. S. 
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C. A., Sec. 1, et seq., does not involve any fraudulent intent. 
Indeed, in the absence of the bankruptcy law, a diligent·cred-
itor may lawfully retain a preference irrespective of his 
knowledge of his debtor's insolvency. But the purpose of tho 
bankruptcy act is to bring about equality of division of assets 
amongst creditors. For the rule that to the diligent creditor 
belong·s the reward, the Act substitutes the rule that equality 
is equity. Congress has seen fit to provide that if a creditor 
has reasonable cause to believe that his debtor is insolvent 
and, consequently, that the property received from him in 
payment will effectuate a preference: he may not withhold 
the same as against other creditors. A preference is not an, 
act evil in itself but one prohibited by the baµkruptcy act 
i,n the interest of equality of division * * *.'' 
Discussing the · provision of the Act which makes it un-
necessary to bring home to the creditor actual knowledge of 
insolvency, further on in the opinion the court . says : 
"Defendant was charged with what it learned or should 
have learned as a reasonably prudent business man, through 
its representatives in their three days' visit to M:onence._ 
.Failure to investigate would afford no excuse when the cred-
itor's knowledge and inferences arc sufficient to put an or-
dinary business man on inquiry. Hchoenbrod v. Central Trust 
Co., 7 Cir. 238, Fed. 775; Reed v. Federal F·inance Corp. 
(D. C.), 291 Fed. 679 at page 680; In Re Campion (D. 0.)., 
256 Fed. 902 at page 907. It is not a question of actual be-
lief. Rather, it is the belief that ought reasonably to be enter-
tained under the facts known-the inference which an or-
dinary intelligent business man would draw from the facts 
which he would discover if he had made inquiry. Defend-
ant co~ld not close its eyes to knowledge of obvious facts, or 
to facts which it could have· ascertained bv · making the in-
quiry of a reasonably prudent business man.'' 
22• • Another excellent statement of the rule is found in 
8 c~ J. s. 707 as follows: 
'' Actual knowledge or belief is not necessary; r( 1sonable 
cause to believe that the debtor is insolv.ent is sufficient. Fur-
thermore, the actual belief of the creditor that the debtor is 
solvent will :µot prevent the avoidance of the preference if 
such belief is not a reasonable one under the circumstances, 
or if the creditor has such information as requires an investi-
gation which would disclose insolvency." 
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.!Jiother authority upon the law of bankruptcy (Collier on 
J3ankruptQy, 14:th Ed., V-ol. S, page 996) in speaking of the 
:sort of investigational inquiry that is demanded -of the credi.. • · 
t~r in such a case, has this to say: 
., 'In such case an inquiry of the debtor alone is generally 
insufficient where his answer under the circumstances could 
readily have been found to be untrue. As a matter or fact, 
it is the creditor's cause for belief and not the debtor's knowl-
edge or lack -of it that is important. .And if the 'Creditor fails 
to make an inquiry when he has a duty to do so, he will be 
,charged with all th~ lmowledge which he would have acquired 
had he conducted such an investigation." 
Such being the law, let us turn to the evidence to see 
whether or not this defendant, the Arlington .Amusement Cor· 
poration., through its secretary and treasurer, Mr. Wood, was 
in possession of such facts as would place him tipon· inquiry 
in regard to the financial status of the bankrupt. 
First of all, this same wit~ess, Mr. ·wood, testified that 
when his corporation entered into this lease with the bank-
rupt (January, 1943), she put up $1,000.00 as security for 
the .rent. Later on, he testified, she took this security down 
{M. R-., pp. 41, 42). Defendant, therefore, lmew that she had 
need of this money and to that extent was put on guard. 
23* *He later testified (M. R., p. 44) that she had kept her 
rent paid up in satisfactory fashion until late in the fall 
of 1944 when she fell behind. and that when ·the business was 
sold, she was two and one-half months in arrears. Further-
more, the witness admitted ( M. R.,.p. 44) that he knew she 
bad purcµas~d the Rainbow Grill,· and since it is in evidence 
that in connection with this business (M. R., p. 39) she had 
given a mortgage as security for a large sum of money ad-
vanced, inquiry on the part of the defendant would have re .. 
vealed the amount of this indebtedness, which, being a mort-
gage or deed of trust, was duly recorded. · 
The witness Cohen also testified that when be first went 
to Wood with his claim of over $1,000.00, he was told that the 
bankrupt was heavily involved .. For example, on page 27, 
this is his statement: 
''Q. Did he indicate to you anything about whether Mrs. 
Smith was more or less ·heavily involved at the time? 
'' A. Yes, I believe he did. «i • * '' 
It is inter~sting. to note in passing that in answer to the 
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court's own questions-~ the witness Cohen was frank to . say 
that the impression he received from his dealings with the 
• pankrupt was that she was insolvent .. For-example (M. R.,, 
p. 30):. 
"Q. Did you feel that Mrs .. Smith at tha:t time was in-
solvent! 
"A: Yes, siri I did. I felt she was in a pretty bad cireum-
_stance, hut insolvency, I cannot say. That term. designates. 
· a person, I believe, to be hopeles-sily and consciously hope·-
lessly unable and unwilling, almost, to pay their. .. obligations .. 
· But this woman firmly stood on the ground that she was 
24 ~ going to '~see me paid, and everyone else, every one of 
her creditors, because she was ambitious, hardwo.rking· 
and intended to stay in business, and assured me I would get 
every cent from her that was coming to me.'' 
This witness also described the bankrupt's financial con-
dition when he later stated (M. R., pp .. 30, 31) : 
I • 
"A .. I certainly did not, because I knew other creditors 
were getting money from her, pushing her and holding t11eir 
hands out right at her cash register every day, but I must 
add, sir, for my own good and well being that I knew that 
she was insolvent, or· rather hard pressed, but I· was doing 
119 more than other creditors were doing, and no more than 
the Arlington Amusement Company themselves were doing .. '" 
Here we see that this witness Cohen stated that this de-
fendant itself was "holding their ·hands out right at ber 
cash register every day.'' It is difficult to understand how 
any situation would be calculated to put a careful creditor on 
inquiry more than was done in this case. He was going to 
see the bankrupt every week about his own claim (M. R., p. 
34). 
In regard to tlie time when the witness Cohen had his first 
interview with Mr. Wood in· regard to this matter, it can 
hardly be· doubted that it was certainly no later than J annary 
17th.. In this connection, Cohen testified as to the time of 
his first interview with Wood that he went to see him ''imme-
diately" after his final interview with bankrupt on January 
8th (M. R .. , pp. 26; 28, 29), and Wood himself admitted that 
it was before January 17th when he had this interview with 
Cohen. Here is his statement (M. R., p .. 57): 
"A. I don't know that I can say when I bad reason to be-
lieve that she was insolvent. I will say. that when I first 
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knew that she had bills in excess of the amount that was due 
her from Arlington .Amusement C.<;>mpany, that was the 
25* first date when :Mr. *Mitchell Cohen came in and pre-
sented the bill of Siegel's Market, and one other bill, 
Hastings, I believe. 
"Q. Can you say when that was? Mr. Cohen was rather 
indefinite. · 
'' A. I am not positive as to the date, but I would say that 
it was within a week after the original agreement was made. 
I would say it was within a week when pe first visited me.'' 
o I • 
This witness, who was secretary and treasurer of the de-
fendant corporation, r.eally put an end to all uncertainty in 
reference to reasonable cause to believe this debtor to be in-
solvent when on page 56 of the I\fanuscript Record he ad-
mitted that he would have reason to believe she was insolvent. 
Here is the evidence on that question: 
"Q. Can you tell the Court when it was that you knew tliat 
the amount of the claims or debts against her were more than· 
the funds, this $2,500.00 in your hands, with which to pay 
them? 
'' A. I would say that it was about a week after the original 
agreement. 
'' Q. A week after the 10th of January Y 
"A. I would say about that time. 
'' Q. Which would make it about the 17th of Jan nary! 
"A. Well, it might have been the 17th, might have been the 
16th., I don't know. I wouldn't say. 
'' Q. It- was along in there you knew she was insolvent T 
'' A. I didn't know it. 
"Q. You had reasonable c.ause to believe she was? 
'' A. I had reason to believe, but in the meanwhile she had 
assured me that all of these bills would be paid, that sbe· was 
taking in a partner in the Rainbow Grill who was going to 
put up the cash, that she would send me money to pay all of· 
these bills in full. '' 
26• *Counsel for the plaintiff believes that the evidence 
is perfectly clear on this point from another standpoint, 
and that is that this witness Mr. ,vood admits in his testi-
mony that the bankrupt told him she was insolvent. For in-
stance, on page 55 of the :Manuscript Record, he says that 
when he called her attention to the fact that he had received 
bills against her in the sum of $4,000.00 and only $2,500.00 in 
hand with which to pay them, she told him she was "getting 
a partner" who would put up $10,000.00 _in cash with which 
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to pay these bills. And ag·ain, on page 56, she repeated this 
statement when she said that she was taking in a partner in 
connection with the Rainbow Grill who was going to put up 
enough cash with ·which to pay all of the bills. 
If this is not a clear-cut admission on the part of the 
bankrupt that she did not have the assets with which to pay. 
the bills which were then in Mr. Wood's hands, then it is 
impossible to bring home to this defendant rea~onable cause 
to believe Mrs. Smith was hisolvent, and when we add to this 
evidence the fact that on January 12th · a garnishee process 
was served on the defendant garnisheeing the fundEt in his 
hands to pay a judgment in favor of the Richmond News-
papers for nearly $500.00., counsel believes the burden of proof 
on the issue of knowledge of insolvency has been abundantly 
borna . 
Furthermore, a reading of the agreement between defend-
ant and bankrupt of January 10th shows that the defendant, 
· to say the least, had very little confidence in debtor's 
.27• ":financial status, or it would not have gone to the lengths 
it did in order to protect itself. 
In passing·, it should be noted that even though we may 
believe this defendant in good faith did not quite grasp the 
fact that the debtor was insolvent on January 17th, this is 
not decisive. Actual good faith in believing that a debtor is 
not insolvent does not prevent the avoidance of his pref er-
e nee. See Lowell v. Chaisson, 300 Fed. 219. 
In conclusion we summarize the facts known to this def end-
ant in regard to insolvency: Bankrupt was selling out her 
business while considerablv in arrears in her account with 
the defendant; it had been guarnisheed on a judgment of 
nearly $500.00 (M. R., p. 54); it had in its hands claims _ag-
gregating $4,000.00 with only $2,500.00 with which to pay 
them; defendant's secretary- treasurer admitted on the stand 
that he had reason to believe bankrupt was insolvent and 
stated that bankrupt herself had told him she hoped to get a 
loan from an unnamed third party of around $10,000.00. out 
of which her obligations could be taken earo of. It is re-
spectfully submitted that not .only does this amount to "rea-
sonable cause to believe'', but it amounts to actual knowledge 
obtained from the lips of the bankrupt herself of insolvency. 
* 
The attention of this Honorable Court is directed to the 
fact that petitioner is expressly authorized to prosecute this 
appeal, as -shown by- the order. entered by the Trustee in 
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Bankruptcy, a copy -0f which is oontained in this *peti-
:2s• tion (see Appendix A). It will be seen from the lan-
guage ,of this 01'.Cler that it is. the view ·Of the Referee 
in Bankruptcy that there is a substantial question of law pre-
.sented in. this case which 'Should be passed upon and deter-
mined by this· Honor.able Court. 
CONCLUSION .. 
Petitioner 1·espectfully submits that he has abundantly met 
the burden of proof in this matter; that the action of the 
lower court in holding that this transaction did not amount 
to a preferential payment, giving the defendant an ad-
vantage .over other credtiors of the same class, was erroneous ; 
and that the evidence shows as a matter of law that defendant 
had reasonable cause to believe at the time of the preferential 
payment that defendant was, in fact, insolvent. 
Petitioner, therefore, respectfully urges that the judgment 
of the trial court may be reviewed and reversed and that final 
judgment for the plaintiff be entered by this H<;morable Court 
adjudging that petitioner recover of the defendant tbe full 
amount of the preierential payment, .viz., $1,343.92, with in-
terest thereon from January 17, 1945~ · 
Counsel for this petitioner desires to state orally his rea-
sons for reviewing the judgment of the trial court and hereby 
adopts this petition as his opening brief in the event a writ 
of error should be awarded. 
Respectfully, 
J. WELLFORD SMITH, 
Trustee in Bankruptcy of Dolly C. 
Smith, also known aij Mrs. Mike A. 
Smith, individually, and trading as 
Rainbow Grill and also as Squire 
Grill, 
By MAY., SIMPKINS, YOUNG & RUDD, 
Counsel. 
1233 Mutual Building, 
Richmond 19, Virginia. 
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29• ~I, John G, May, Jr.., whose address is 1288 Mutual 
Building, Richmond, Virginia, an attorney practicing 
in the Sup11eme Court of Appeals of Virginia~ do certiry that 
in my opinion the judgment re:ndered for the defendant by 
the Law and Equity Oom;j; of the City Qf Richmond, Part II,. 
on August 14, 1945, in the case of J. Wellford Smith,: Trustee,. 
etc., v. Arlington Amusement Corporationr transcript of the 
record of which case fa attached hereto, should be :reviewed 
by the Supreme Court o;f Appeals of Virginia. 
Given under my hand this 24 day of September, 19.46. 
JOHN G .. MAY, JR. 
Notice that the foregoing petition for a writ of error and 
the accompanying record will be filed in the Clerk 'a Office of 
the Stipreme Court of Appeals on the 25th day of September, 
1945~ is hereby acknowledged .. 
Receipt of a copy of the for~oing petiticm is ~ls<J ackuowl-: 
edged. 
Witnes$ my hanµ this 24th day of September, 1945 .. 
MILES. POINDEXTER,. 
Coun$el for Arlington Amusement 
Corporation. 
Received Sept. 25, 1945. 
M:. B. W .A TTS, Clerk .. 
October 10, 1945. ·writ of error awarded by· the court. 
Bond $300 .. 
· M.B. vV. 
ao~ ~ APPENDIX A, 
In the Distdct Oourt of the United States f.or the Eastern 
District of Virginia, Richmond Division. 
In the matter of 
Dolly C. Smith, also known as Mra. Mike A. Smith, in-
dividually and trading as Rain bow Grill and also as Squhe 
Grill, Alleged Bankrupt. 
J. Wellford Smith, Trustee, v. Arlington Amus. Corp. 23 
IN BANKRUPTCY NO. 17-306 
ORDER. 
Upon considei·ation of the report of J. Wellford Smith, 
Trustee in Bankruptcy, this day filed, and it appearing from 
said report that in the suit of the said Trustee agajnst the 
Arling-ton Amusement Corporation for the avoidance of a · 
preferential payment., a final order has been entered by the 
Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part II, 
adverse to the contention of the Trustee, and it further ap-
pearing· that there is a substantial question of law involved 
in this suit which should be passed upon by the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, it is 
ORDERED that J. ·wellford Smitli, Trustee in Bankruptcy 
in this matter, be, and he is hereby, authorized to prosecute 
an appeal from· the Law and Equity Court of the City of 
Richmond, Part II, to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the 
State of Virginia for the purpose of seeking a reversal of the 
judgment of the lower court. · 
A T1·ue Copy: 
MELVIN WALLINGER,. 
Referee in Bankruptcy. 
September 21, 1945. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: . 
'Pleas before the Honorable H~lskins Hobson, Judge of 
the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
Two, held for the said City at the Courtroom thereof in the 
City Hall on the 17th day of August, 1945. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, • 
Part Two, on the 24th day of May, 1945: Came J. Wellford 
Smi.th, Trustee •in Bankruptey for Dolly C. Smith, also known 
as Mrs. Mike A. Smith, individually an_d trading as Rainbow 
Grill and also as Squire Grill, by counsel, and filed his Notice 
of Motion for Judgment against Arlington Amusement Cor-
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poration, a Virginia corporation., which Notice of Motion for. 
Judgment is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
' 'Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part IT. 
J. Wellford Smith, Trustee in Bankruptcy for Dolly C. Smith, 
also known as Mrs. Mike A. Smith, individually and trad-
ing as Rainbow Grill and also as Squire Grill, Plaintiff, 
·v. 
Arlington Amusement Corporation ( a Virginia corporation), 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To The Arlington, Amusement Corporation (a Virginia cor-
poration) : · 
·page 2 ~ The Arlington Amusement Corporation, herein-
after called the defendant, is hereby notified that on 
the 9th day of June, 1945, at 10 :00 o'clock A. M .. , or as soon 
as· the motion may be heard, J. Wellford Smith., Trustee in 
Bankruptcy for D~lly C. Smith, also known as Mrs. Mike A. 
Smith, individually and trading as Rainbow Grill and also as 
Squire Grill, hereinafter called plaintiff, will make. a motion 
before the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part II, at its courtroom in the' said City, for a judgment . 
. against the defendant in the sum of Fourteen Hundred Eleven 
Dollars and sixty-two cents .($1,411.62), with interest thereon 
from the 10th day of January, 1945, until paid, which sum is 
due and _owing· to the plaintiff by the defendant by reason of 
the following· facts and circumstances, to-wit: 
(1) On April 9, 1945, one Dolly C. Smith, also known as 
Mrs. Mike A. Smith, individually and trading- as Rainbow 
Grill and also as Squire Grill, was adjudicated by the United. 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Yirginia as · 
, a bankrupt on a petition of involuntary bankruptcy filed· 
· against l1er on or about the 11th day of March, 1945. 
(2) On the 4th day of May, 1945, the plaiiatiff, herein. J. 
Wellford Smith, by an order entered by the Referee in Bank-
ruptcy for the said United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia, was appointed Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy for said Dolly C. Smith, and he has since qualified 
.J. Wellford Smith, Trustee, v. Arlington .A.mus. Corp. 2i 
and given bond for the f aithfnl discharge (of his duties as 
such, and he has been dulv .authorized and directed to bring 
this suit. 
page 3} (3) On January 10, 1945, and for some time prfor 
thereto, the said Dolly C.. Smith was the owner ~nd 
operator of a restaurant business located at 305-307 North 
Sixth Street, Richmond, Virginia, under the J1ame and style 
of "Squire Grill", and in and about the operation of said 
business, she leased the premises and all equipment .and :fix-
tures thereon from the defendant. On said date, .she was 
indebted to the said defendant under the · terms of said lease 
in the amount of Eleven Hundred Thirty-two Dollars and 
thirty-six cents ($1,132.36), all of which was past due. 
(4) On January 10, 1945~ the said Dolly n Smith also was 
indebted to the defendant in the additional amount of- Two 
Hundred S~venty-nine Dollars and twenty-six cents ($279.26) 
for the use and .occupation of certain other premises at· 408;~ 
North Eighth Street, Richmond, Virginia, under the terms 
of a lease whereby she had oceupied said premises for some-
time, which sum was likewise at said time past due. · 
(5) On the said 10th day of January, 1945, the said Dolly 
C. Smith and the Arlington Amusement Corporation entered 
into a contract or agreement wher~by they undertook and did 
sell and deliver unto E. D. Foster and L.B. Foster, with geu. 
eral warranty of title, the said restaurant business· known as 
. Squire Grill, including all :fixtures and equipment therein, for 
the purchase price of Eig·hty-five Hundred Dollars {$8,500.00), 
which sum of money was paid unto the defendant and pos-
session of said business and equipment was delivered unto 
the purchaser. , 
(6) By specific and express agreement between 
page 4 }· the said defendant and Dolly C. Smith, the de(end-
ant was to retain the sum of Six Thousand Dollars 
($6,000.00) out of said purchase price in payment for its in-
terest in the business, including the :fixtures and equipment 
leased by it to Dolly C. SJ;I1ith, and the remaining sum of 
Twenty-five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00), which was consid-
ered as· payment to the said Dolly C. Smith for her interest 
in said business, was to be. disbursed· by the defendant for 
and- on behalf of the said Dolly c~ Smith, payment therefrom: 
to be made to certain creditors of Dolly C. Smith, including 
the defendant itself, whose claim was to be paid in full. A 
copy of the agreement between the defendant and the said 
Dolly C. Smith as to the division and disposal of the said pur-
chase price of Eighty-five. Hundred Dollars ($8,50(:>.00) is 
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attacl1ed to this notice of motion as "Exhr"bit. A" and to be 
read as a part hereof. · 
(7) Following receipt by it of the said Eighty-five Hun-
dred Dolla:rs ($8,500..00), defendant, in accordance with the 
terms of the said agreement with Dolly C. Smith., appro-
priated Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) therefrom in pay-
ment of its interest in the business sold and out of the said 
Dolly C. Smith's share in this fund, it paid itself the sum of 
Fourteen __Hundred Eleven Dollars and sixty-two cents 
($1,41L6~).}n full of the indebtedness to it of the- said Dolly 
C. Smith as of° said date. The remainder of said fund, namely, 
Ten Hundred Eighty-eight Dollars and thirty-eight cents 
($1,088.38), has been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff 
to be administered for the benefit of all the creditors of' the 
lJankrupt. 
(8) On the said 10th da~ of January, 1945, the 
page 5 ~ said Dolly C. Smith was insolvent in that she was 
· . unable to satisfy all of her creditors from her as-
sets, and this fact was well known to the defendant, which 
undertook to protect itself by agreeing with the_ said bank-
rupt that .out of the bankrupt's interest in the sale price of 
her said business, it was to pay itself in full before disburs-
ing any of the fund in its possession to other of the bank-. 
rupt 's creditors. 
(9) Plaintiff, therefore., alleges and charges that on or 
about the 10th day of January, 1945, Dolly C. Smith, the bank-. 
rupt, while insolvent and within four months of the date of 
the filing against her of the petition for bankruptcy in this 
case, made a transfer of her property, to-wit, the sum of 
Fourteen. Hundred Eleven Dollars and sixty-two cents 
($1,411.62) in cash to the defendant in payment of an ante-
cedent debt then past due, and that sai.d transfer thereby 
enaoled the defendant to obtain a greater percentage of its 
debt than any other of bankrupt's creditors of the same class; 
that the said defendant knew or had reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the said Dolly C. Smith.was insolvent and also knew 
or had reasonable cause to believe that said transfer would 
effect a preference in its favor. 
(10) The above being the facts, therefore, plaintiff is ad-
vised and verily be.lieves that under the bankruptcy laws and 
statutes of the United States of ... t\..merica plaintiff is entitled 
to have returned to him by the defendant the amount of said 
preferential payment to be administered in the bankruptcy 
court for the benefit of all of bankrupt's creditors, 
page 6 + sbare and share alike. 
Wherefore., plaintiff_ will make a motion before 
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the Law and Equity Cotut of the City of Richmond, 
Part II,. on the date and at the time above set forth, for a 
judgment. against defendant in tho sum of Fourteen Hundred 
Eleven Dollars and sixty-two cents ($1~411.62), with interest 
thereon from the 10th day of Janu.a:ry, 1946, until paid. 
- ' 1 ' - . 
J. WELLFORD SM.·ITH, 
Trustee ·in Bankruptcy for Dolly C. 
Smith, also known as Mrs. Mike .A.. 
. ·smith;, individually and trading as 
· Rainbow Grill and also as Squire 
Grill, 
By MAY, SIMPKINS, YOUNG & RUDD 
Mrs~ D. S. Smith 
Riehtnorid 
Virginia:·;: . ; . r . ~O': 
R. HUGH RUDD . 
EXHIBIT A, 
Richmond, Virginia 
January 10, 1945 
Dear: M1~s. Smi:tb i . ~ ' 
We are this ~ay agreeing to sell to Messrs. FoeM:t, all_ fix-
tures, equipm~nt, dishes,· pots. an~ pans, cooking utensils, sil-
ver, china, and glassware and all other articles, except sup-
plies at the SQUIRE Restaurant, No. 305-307 North Sixth 
.Street, Richmond, Virginia. , 
It is agreed between: you and the 1:1ndersigned as follows : 
1. Out of the proceeds of this money,, when receiv~d by ·11s, 
we will retain the sum of $2,500.00 for your account,. for- a 
period of sixty days, provided that out of said sum, tber.e is to 
be appropriated and used: First, so much as necessary to pay 
the amounts of rent unpaid by you on the restaurant 
page 7 ~ and on 408~ North 8th Street; .and,. Second1 so 
much further as necessary to pay the amounts of all 
bills for merchandise and services that you owe in connection 
with the' ope1·ation of the SQUIRE Restaurant .. 
2. Any part of the $2;500.00 not needed for payments men-
tioned in parsgra ph 1 is to be·. paid to· yo1:i: ·at; the·. expiration 
of said sixty ( 60) days. . .. 
3. If the rent, merchandise and service debts mentionm;T ill 
paragraph.1 are in excess of $2,500.00, you are to' pay the 
excess of said debts .. 
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. 4. You will give possession of this restaurant, together with 
all equipment, dishes, pots and pans., cooking utensils, silver, 
china and glasswa.re, and all· other articles. except supplies, 
to the new purchaser on or before January 15, 1945, and your 
rent will stop as of the day you give possession, and the pur-
chaser will start to pay rent as of that date. 
Very truly yours, 
ARLINGTON AMUSE CORPORATION 
By 
ACCEPTED: 
And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 9th day of June, 
1945. . . 
J. Wellford Smith, ~rustee in Bankruptcy for Polly C. Smith., 
also known as M:rs. Mike A. Smith, individually and trading 
as Rainbow Grill and also as Squire Grill, plaintiff 
against 
Arlington Amusement Corporation, (a Virginia corporation), 
defendant 
MOTION. 
This day came the plaintiff and defendant, by counsel, and 
on the motion of the plaintiff, by his attorney, it is 
page 8 ~ ordered that this suit be docketed. · 
The def end ant then bv leave of Court filed herein 
its ''plea'' and put itself upon the Country and the plaintiff 
likewise. 
Virgfufa: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part II. 
J. Wellford Smith, Trustee in Bankruptcy for Dolly O. Smith, 
also known as Mrs. Mike A. Smith, individually and trading 
as Rainbow Grill and also as Squire Grill, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Arlington Amusement Corporation, (a Virginia corporation), 
Defendant. . 
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PLEA .. 
·For Plea to the Notice of M-0tion served upon it. in this 
:action, the said defendant by its attorneys says that i{ did 
not., or undertake with the -said plaintiff in the manner and 
form complained of in said plaintiff's Notice of Motion and 
does not -0we the .said plaintiff the sum of money ~lleged 
therein or any -0ther sum or sums; · · 
And of this the said defendant puts itself upon the country .. 
ARLINGTON AMUSEMENT CORPORATION 
By.Counsel 
CHRISTIAN BARTON PARKER & BOYD 
. p.d .. 
page 9 } And at ~mother day, to-wit:· At a Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, P~i:t Two~ held the 
13th day of July, 1945. 
·. This day came the plaintiff and defendant, by their conn .. 
sel, and on motion of the plaintiff, consented to by t~e de-
fendant as evidenced by its endorsement by counsel 6£ this 
order, it js ordered that the plaintiff's notice. of motion here-
tofore filed in this case be, and the same is hereby, amended 
as follows : · · 
In the opening paragraph of said notice of motion, in the 
11th line thereof, the date "10th day of January, 1945," is 
hereby amended to read '' 17th day of January, 1945. '' 
In paragraph 8 of the said notice of motion, in the 1st line 
thereof, the date ''10th day of January, 1945, '' is amended 
to read "17th day of January, 1945. '' · 
In the 9th paragraph of the notice of motion, in the 2nd 
lines thereof, the da.te '' 10th , day of January, 1945, '' is 
amended to read "17th day of January, 1945." 
In the next to the last line of said notice. of motion the 
date "10th day of January, 1945," is _amended to read "_17th 
day of .January, 1945. '' 
And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 14th day of Au-
gust, 1945. 
Thi~ day came the said plaintiff by his attorneys, pursuant 
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to his notice of motion for jn<loament duly executed 
page 10 ~ upon the said defendant, returned and docketed in 
the Office of the Clerk of this Court and- thereafter · 
duly amended by leave of Court, and moved the Court for 
judgment against said defendant in the amount and.upon the 
grounds set forth in the said notice as so amended; and 
came also the said defendant by its attorneys, pursuant to 
its plea of the geµeral issue ·and statement of' grounds of de-
fense heretofQre filed to said plaintiff's notice of moti9n; 
and the .s~ic\- parties, plaintiff and def enda:nt, having waived 
a jury, all-issues of law and fact were submitted to the Court: 
On· consideration whereof, the Court having heard in open 
Court. the evidence submitted consisting of the testimony of 
witnesses, the stipnlatioµ of-the parties and the exhibits filed 
and the argument of counsel upon the several issues of law 
and fact prese.nted by the pleadings and the evidence, and 
having -matt;tt'ely -considered of its judgment, for the reasons 
set forth in~the form -of a Ietf;er t~ counsel dated August 2·, 
1945, which said letter is hereby made a part of the record 
in this cause, .doth accordingly adjudge and· order that the said 
plaintiff do reco.ver nothing from the said defendant in this 
;1ction, and that the said defendant have judgment against 
t~~ said plaintiff. for its costs her-ein exp.ended. 
;To which· action: of the court .pfaintiff by counsel excepted 
upon the f'ollowing grounds: The verdict is contrary to th()' 
law and the evidence and without evidence to support it, and 
is based upon evidence improperly admitted: 
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In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Partil. 
J. Welfo1·d Smith, Trustee in Bankruptcy for Dolly C, Smith, 
also known as Mrs. Mike A. Smith, individually and,.;t/a 
Rainbow Grill and also as Squire Grill, Plain.tiff, : · · rr ~ . 
11. .. . 
Arlington Amusement Corporation (a Virginia corporation), 
Defendant. · 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE. 
Now comes the said defendant by its attorneys, reserving 
unto itself the right to make such other and further defense~ 
by way of pleading, motion, or objection, as may be p:rope:r 
at any stage in the trial of this action, and states the follow-
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ing as its g1·oun¢[s of defense to said plaintiff's notice of mo-
tion for judgment: 
1. Defendant denies that it is inde.bted· to plaintiff in tl1e 
sum of money claimed in said notice of motion or in any sum 
whatsoever. 
2. Defendant denies that by specific and express agreement 
between said defendant and Dolly C. Smith, the defendant was 
to retain $6,000 out of said purchase price in payment of its 
interest in the business, including the fixtures and equipment. 
leased by it to Dolly C. Smith, and the remaining sum of 
$2,500 was to be considered . as payment to Dolly C. Smith 
as her interest in said business,. but defendant says the agree-
ment between itself and Dolly C. Smith, a copy of which was 
attached to plaintiff's notice of motion as ''Ex-
page 12 ~ hibit A'' is controlling and speaks for itself. 
3. Defendant denies that following the receipt 
of $8,500 as the purchase price of said fixtures and equip-
ment it appropriated $6,000 as its interest in the business . 
and out of Dolly C. Smith's share in said $8,500 it paid itself 
the sum of. $1,411.62 in full of the indebtedness to it of the 
said Dolly 0. Smith as of said date. 
4. Defendant says that it is without knowledge as to 
whether or not Dolly C. Smith was insolvent as alleged in 
said notice of motion. However, defendant denies that it knew 
or had reasonable cause to believe that the said Dolly C. Smith 
was insolvent and def end ant further denies that it had rea-
sonable cause to believe that said transaction would t,ffect a 
preference in its favor as alleged by plaintiff in said notice 
of motion. 
5. Defendant denies the allegation in said notice of motion 
to the effect that defendant UI}.dertook to protect itself by 
agreeing with Dolly C. Smith that out of her interest in th(l 
sale price of her business, it, the defendant, was to pay itself 
-in full. 
6. Defendant denies that Dolly C. Smith made a transfer 
of her property .in the sum of $1,411.62 in cash, or any part 
thereof, to defendant in payment of an antecedent debt tb~n 
past due, and further denies that said transaction enabled 
the defendant to obta.in a greater percentage of its debt than. 
any other of Dolly C. Smith's creditors of the same class. 
7. Defendant says that it was the owner of all 
page 13 } the equipment, fixtnres, dishes, pots and pans. 
- cooking utensils, silver, china, glassware, and all 
other articles sold to Messrs. Foster under the contract of 
sale dated January 10, 1945, and hereinbefore referr~d to in 
said notice of motion ; 
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8. Dolly C. Smith was not the · owner of any ·part of said 
equipment and fixtures; 
9. Dolly C. Smith had no specific interest in any part of 
the proceeds of sale, and that if it can be said she did haYl1 
an interest it was contingent only as set forth in the con-
tract, copy of which is attac:b,.ed to said notice of motion; 
10. The transaction resulted iri an increase in the common 
fund of the debtor, Dolly C. Smith; rather than merely a re-
duction in liabilities and therefore, there is no liability upon 
the def end ant as the transaction. did not constitute a void-
. able preference within the meaning of the bankruptcy laws 
and statutes of the United States of America. -
. 
ARLINGTON AMUSEMENT CORPORATION, 
By Counsel. 
CHRISTIAN, BARTON, PARKER & BOYD, 
Counsel for Defendant. 
Mr. R. Hugh Rudd 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Mutual Building 
and 
Mr: Miles Poindexter 
Counsel for Defendant 
Mutual Building 
Richmond, Va. 
August 2nd, 1945 
page 14~ In. Re: J. Wellford Smith, Trustee, &c., 
. v. Arlington Amusement Corp. 
Gentlemen: 
I have carefully considered the evidence and the arguments 
and briefs of counsel. 
· Viewing all of the evidence relating to the · sale of Squire 
Grill and the disposition of the proceeds, I ~ of the opinion 
that no preference was created within the purview of the 
Bankruptcy Act. Considering the transaction in its entirety. 
no creditor of Mrs. Smith has been deprived of his fair share 
in her esta~e~ Her estate was in no way diminished thereby, 
but on the other hand was augmented to the extent of more 
than a $1,000.00 and the creditors were further b~nefited hr 
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the elimination of the defendant's claim of about $1,400.00 
from a share in the augmented estate. . 
An order may be presented showing the submission o~ all . 
. questions of law and fact to the Court, the Court's finding, 
:and dismissing the ease from the docket. -
Yours very truly, 
· And now -at sald day, to-wit: At a Law and. Equlty Court 
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 17th day of Au-
gust, 1945. · 
This day the Judge of this Court delivered to the Clerk 
thereof a -certificate of exceptions, duly signed by said Judge, 
which certificate of exceptions is· now filed and made a part 
rof the record herein. · 
Virginia~ 
In the Law and Equity Court' of the City of Richmond, 
· Part II. ,, 
page 15 } J. Wellford Smith, Trustee, etc., Plaintiff, 
fJ. 
Arlington Amusement Corporation, Def'endant. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
Be it remembered that on the trial oi this case, July 13, 
1945, the following evidence, including the ·exhibits therein 
mentioned and the statement of the Court's conclusions men-
tioned in the order entered herein on August 14, 1945, on l;>e-
half of plaintiff and defendant respectively, as hereafter de-
noted, was introduced, and the same was all of the evidence 
introduced on beh~lf of the plaintiff and of the defendant. 
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In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part I!. 
J. Wellford Smith, Trustee in Bankruptcy for Dolly C. Smith~ 
also known as Mrs. Mike A. Smith, individually and trad-
ing as -Rainbow Grill and also a~ Squire Grill -{Plaintiff), 
v. 
Arlington Amusement Corporation, a Virginia corporation · 
(Defendant). 
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· . Transcript of all of the evidence and ot;her incidents of t:he 
above tried on July 13, 1945, befor-e Honorable Haskins Hoh-
son:, Judge of the said Court. 
. 
Appearances: R. Hugh R·udd, Es-qnire, conns·eI for the plain-
tiff; Miles Poindexter II, Esquire,. counsel for the defendantr 
page 17 f Mr. -Rudd: If Your Bono: ph~ase, this __is a su~t 
brought by J. Wellford Smith, Trustee m Bank-
ruptcy for Dolly C. Smith, also known as Mrs. Mike A. Smith,. 
individually and trading as Ra_inbow Grill, and also as Squire 
Grill, ag;~inst Arlington Amusement .. C?rporation, a Virginia 
corporation, for the purpose of avoiding a preference. 
It is stipulated between the parties that the following al-
legations of fact in the Notice of Motion are the true facts in 
the case. · 
Paragraph No. 1 of the Notice of Motion; Paragraph N Or 
2 ; Parag·raph No. 3 except that the figure or :figures con- . 
tained in the last two lines of Paragraph 3 should be '' $1,-
064.66 '' instead of "$1,132.36"; the facts contained in Para-
graph No. ~hmd Paragraph No. 5 are likewise stipulated. 
I believe that is all_ of the allegations of the Notice of Mo-
tion that are stipulated to be the facts of the case. 
The Court: I call your attention, Mr. Rudd, to the Notice 
of Motion as now amended to the fact that you charge that 
on the 17th day of January, 1945, this lady was insolvent~ 
and that the defendant knew it, and that on th~ 
page 18 ~ 17th of January the money was v.aid, actual trans-
fer was made, and so. forth, while the contract it-
self appears to have been on the loth. I jttst eall your atten-
tion to that situation. 
Mr. Rudd: Yes, sir. 
The Court: In other ,vords, it does not seem an allegatior1 
here that on the ~0th day of January that :Mrs. Smith was 
insolvent, or that he kn~w she wns insolvent, or had reason-
able cause to know it. 
Mr. Rudd: That was as of the 17th. 
The Court: You mean at the date of the contract there is 
no allegation that she was ~ither insolV'ent or that he had rea-
sonable cause to believe she was insolvent. I am just calling 
your attention to that particular situation. · · 
· AooordiniJ to the. plaintiff's contention I take it that the 
actual passing of title took place on the 17th instead ot the 
10th, and under and by virtue of the contract. 
~r. Rudd: Previously made on the 10th. 
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The Court: But at the time of the actual transfer was not 
as of the date of the contract. 
Mr. Rudd: That is rig·ht. Now I would like to introduae 
in evidence copies of the agreement of the 10th of Janu-
ary, 1945, whereby the defendant and Mrs. Smith 
page 19 }- agreed to sell this business to the eventual pur-
chasers, and also a copy of the Bill of Sale enumer-
ating the specific articles.of personal property, title to which 
pnssed by virtue of the agreement, and ask that they be· desig-
nated as exhibits 1 and 2 for the plaintiff. 
Note: In pimmanc.~ to the above request these documents 
are marked and filed as Exhibit 1.-Plaintiff, and Exhibit 2, 
Plaintiff. · 
Mr. Rudd: I also wish to incorporate into the l'ecord the 
agveement between the defendant and the bankrupt dated 
. January 10th, a copy of which was filed with the original No,,. 
tfoe of Motion .. That has already been designated I ·believe 
with the Notice of Motion as Exhibit ''A''. 
Now, if Your Honor please, I also desire to ·introduce in 
evidence the statement of account which w&s ftirnished by 
the defendant to the plaintiff on May 21, 1945, showing what 
di~poaition ha.d be~n mad~ by the defendant of the amount 
of $2,500.00, which under the terms of the agreement of J anu.-
aey 10th- was to be held and distributed by the defendant 'tor 
or on acQount of the btlnkr1,1pt, and ask that this be designated 
as Exhibit 3-Plaintiff. 
Note : This papeF writing is now marked and . 
pnge 20 } filed_ as Exhibit 3.,.Plaintiff. 
M:r. B,µdd: By way of explanation, if Your Honor plep.se, 
this statement of M~ount whfoh has been introduced in evi .. 
dance as Ex:hibH 8..-Plaintiff- will square with the amount 
<3la.iJned in ·tba Notice of Motion. The di:ff erence being that 
there is an item of $67.70 shown in their accoupt, which was 
paid out to a third party, and which do.es not form any part 
of this controversy. · · 
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JOSEPH ALLEN, . 
a witness introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, first being duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
DIREC.T EXAMINATION. · 
By·Mr. Rudd: . 
· Q. You are Mr. Joseph Allen, t1ie Clerk of the Civil Jus-
tice Court, are you not, sir Y 
A. I am. 
Q. Mr. Allen, I hand to you what purports to be 
page 21 ~ a file or record of a case in your court, and ask 
· · you whether or not that is the record of the case of 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., against .Arlington Amusement 
Corporation? · 
A. Arlington Amusement Company is a co-defendant in it 
in a garnishee proceeding. 
Q. There is a record of a garnishee proceeding; is there 
not? 
A. Yes., sir. . 
Q. Will. you please state for the record what those papers 
show as to who g·arnisheed who Y 
A. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., they garnisheed . the Ar-
lington .Amusement Corporation, co-defendant, and the prin-
cipal defendant is Dolly C. Smith, also known as Mrs. Mike 
A. Smith, individually and trading as Rainbow Grill Restau-
rant and Squire Grill. 
Q. Mr. Allen, will you look at that record and state when 
. the garnishee process was issued from out of your office Y 
A. This wasn't issued out of my office. It was issued by 
the Magistrate on the 11th of January, 1945~ 
Q. Will you look at it and state for the record when it was 
actually served on the .Arlington Amusement Corporation f 
A. It was served on Mr. Harold ID. Wood, Secretary and 
Treasurer of .Arlington Amusement Corporation, ·on the 12th 
day of January, 1945, at 11 :25. 
page 22 ~- Q. A. M.f · 
A. A. M. 
Mr. Rudd: Now if Your Honor please, for purposes of 
this case we would like to int~oduce that., unless and until a 
copy can be made of it, and then I think the proper thing to 
do would be to ·return that to the Clerk's Office, since that is 
an original record. 
.J. Weillord Smith, 'Trustee, ·v. Arlington Amus. Corp. 3V . 
.Jolfflph .Allen. 
:By the Cou:rt-: 
Q. What was the statement about-
A. Garnishment was dismissed on February 8., 1945. . 
:Sy Mr .. Rudd: ( Continued) 
Q.. When was the judgment -entered on which the garnishee 
was issuedt 
A. Civil warrant on January 10, 1945. 
Q. Was judgment entered for the plaintiff against the bank-
:rupt Dolly C. Smith on that date Y 
A. Yes~ sir. 
Q. What was the amount of the judgment 7 . 
A. $480..96, with interest from date of judgment, J:anuary, 
1945. 
Q. Did the defendant garnishee Arlington Amusement Cor-
poration file an answer in the case? 
A. Here is an answer.. I have never read it before., but it 
is filed here. 
page 23 }· By the Court: 
Q .. -The question wa-s, did they file ·an answer t 
A. Yes, sir. I have never seen it before, but it seems to be 
it was an answer filed; yes, "Sir.. 
Q. Do you have the .answer there in your handf 
A. Yes., sir. 
The Court: Then the answer mll speak for itself. 
Mr. Rudd: Yes, sir. Now~ if Your Honor please, I want 
to file the record, the .entire record, of this civil justice court 
-case as ·plaintiff exhibit-4, with ·the understanding that" we 
may substitute copies for the original when copies are made, 
and then the original can be withdrawn. Will that be satis ... 
factory with counsel Y -
Mr. Poindexter: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Rudd: I do not want to keep the original records over 
here. 
Note: ·These original records are now marked and :filed as 
Exhibit 4--Plaintiff. 
Mr. Rudd: For . purposes of the argument of the case, 
which will follow the introduction of evidence, I would like to · 
have those papers before me at the time and I will bringthem 
back to you (Speaking to the witness). 
J8 Sup:ren1e. Court of A.p~Is 0.! Vi:rgi»in 
M itoheZi Cahan .. 
page 24 f A. I wilI lea.vu them here with tb~- 09,urt ... 
Witness stood aside .. 
MITCHELL COHEN, 
a witness introdnced i:o. beb~f of the plaintiffi fi;rst ~illg. duly 
swqrn, teijtifieg. as follows:. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rudd: 
. Q.' Y,rn ar~ M~t Mitchell Oofarq, ·a PfMticir.tg attQrtJ.ey of 
the city of Richmond, are· you JlQt I 
A, Yea, 
Q. How long have you been practicing law in thtl Qlty Qf 
RichmondY 
A. Since J anttary~ 1936, until 19~2, nt which time I W{}~t 
in th~ ~ervice for two year~ ,in4 jtJ$t ,acently l returned. 
Q. Mr" Oohe:n, did Y9U represent a. cr:editQt of 
page 25 ~ the bankrupty in tl!is ca~ Mffil. Dolly O~ Smith? 
Ar Yea, si, .. 
Q. Who was your creditor°l 
A. Siegel's Super Market. 
Q. Siegel'$ Super Market Y 
A, Yee, sir, .A.Isa P, T. Hastings, a seafood wbolef;~le:r. 
Q . .A.pproxiwtttely what n,e tb~ ~n:1<;mnt3 of tho~<.l two 
cl11im~f . . · 
A.!' Seigel 'a e~caaded a th.Qu@nnd dQllars and, aQ f nr as the 
Hns.tings 1 olaim i~ cono~r:ued, th«t was J:Jeve1:al hl!Jldred dQl-
lars. 
Q. Yon have, I presume, filed bQth q}a.ims in tbQ bnnkr'Q.ptcy 
.cou.:r:t, nlad proof of yoirr cfoiJp. it). the baukrtmtcy nourt? 
A. I have not. The collection has now been turned ov~1; to 
Mr. E. A. Marks, Jr., who is forwarding proof of claims. 
Q.. Ml", Oobe;n, up to tha. t).rst of this yaijf w~r~ you ill fo-uch 
with Mrs. Smith in regard to these claims Y . 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did yon aubsequently shortly aftep the :firijt qf the y~ar 
. go to see Mr. Harold Wood, tM. offioia.l in charge of ArUng,. 
tQn Amueeinent CoFpor-ation 1 
A. Yes. 
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Q. How did you happen to go to see Mr. Wood? .. 
A. Mrs. Smith told me about her dealings with Mr. Wood 
. to find a purchaser fot her business, and that r·was 
page 26 ~ to look to him for my-
By the Court: 
Q. Told yoµ what Y 
A. That her dealings with Mr. Wood were to find a pur-
chaser for this business, and I was to look to him to be paid . 
the debt that she owed to my client. · 
Q. When did you go to see Mr. Wood Y 
::M:r. Rudd: J·udge, I am coming to that, if the Court will 
permit me to conclude my examination. 
The Court: -All right, sir, I will withdraw my examination. 
By Mr. Rudd: ( Continued) 
Q. Did you after he told you that Mr. Wood, or his con-
cern, was looking for a pure.baser for the business, did he then 
go to see him 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell us whether you went immediately to see 
him, or you waited some. time, or just what is your recollec-
tion ·on thaU . ' 
A. I am most surely of the opinion I. went irµmediately. 
Q. Would you say by that within several days after she 
told you Y · · • 
. A. Yes, I believe so. 
Q. When you first went to see Mr. Wood, .what was the sub-
stance of your conversation with him? 
page 27 ~ A. 'fhat he would look out for me~ and that he 
would see that if my claim is filed and he sµg-
gested that I do, and that I do file my claim, and that· I would 
take my place in line with other creditors as I would be paid 
when he was ready to distribute the funds. 
Q. Did he indicate to you a~ything· about whether Mrs. 
Smith was more or less heavilv involved at the time? 
A. Yes, I believe he did. I was very much concerned.about 
the claim, and I wanted to be sure to impress Mr. Wood with 
the importance of my being paid, and Mr. Wood always was 
courteous and cordial, and he said tha·t I would be paid, but 
becausf\ so many creditors were notifying him of their claims 
he did not-
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By the Court: 
Q. What say1 
A. Because so many creditors were notifying him of their 
elaims he-didn't believe that I would get as much as I first 
believed, or he· first believed, that I would have g?tten. 
By Mr. Rudd: (Continued) 
_ Q. Did Mrs. Smith when you last talked with her about 
· _ going to see Mr. Wood, did she indicate w by a new purchaser 
was being sought by Mr. Wood for the business Y Did she 
g·ive you any reason for it? 
A. (Pause) Except that she admitted to being indebted 
to her landford, and-
page 28 ~ Q. Mr. Wood was the landlord, was he not? 
A. Representative of the landlord, I believe., or 
associated with the firm of which the landlord was a part. 
Except for that fact I cannot say more. 
Q. Do .you remember in terms of days or dates just when it 
was that you first went to see Mr. Woo~ about this matter¥ 
A. To help myself I ref erred to my own files and found 
that I last received a cash payment from Mrs. Smith on Jann'." 
ary 8, 1945. After that and shortly after that I believe that 
lwent to see Mr. Wood, because I believe that I was fold about 
that time that a purchaser had been.found, and I was to look 
to the fund which he had.and which would belong to her for 
payment of the debt that I represented. 
By the Caurt: 
Q. You are an attorney, Mr. Cohen, and did you feel at. 
the time she paid you that money on the 8th you were getting 
a preference! · . 
A--. No, sir. It never occurred to me. o 
Q. You said it was shortly after the 8th you went to see 
Mr: Wood. What do you mean by that? What might be a 
short time to one person might be a long time to another. 
Would you say you went to him within a month or wjthin a 
week or soY · 
A. Oh, within a week. · 
Q. In other words, you think you went to him 
page 29 ~ prior to the 15th of January Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. would you be cer.tain of that y 
A. No, sir; I would not. May I say, too: I had been col-
lecting for Mrs. Smith for some time, apropos of your ques-
tion to_ me as to whether or not I felt I was getting a prefer-
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rence., I had no n.~eastm .to believe that I would ev-er know or hear 
cof Mr. Wood. I went to Mr.s. Smith as a debtor of a client ef 
mine, went to her- · . 
Q. Whaf I am getting at is this: If this Smith was in-
solvent .at the time you collected the amount, and that you 
knew she was insolvent, had reason to believe you were get-
ting· a preference, then your pref er.ence could be set aside by · 
the trustee. 
A. Y e-s., sir. . 
Q. Did you feel that situation existed on the day you col-
lected your moneyf · · 
A. I must .say Mrs. Smith was always pushed whenever I 
went to see her. 
Q. I am asking you now to tell us how you felt about it. 
A. I definitely did not, because I d~n 't believe it was any 
question of bankruptcy proceedings, or any more than just a 
woman or a business owner being hard press~d, and she was 
paying money to whomever. came there to get it 
pa&'e 30 } and pushed her for it. · · 
Q. You understand that .a pref ere nee need not 
relate to the bankruptcy proceeding. · Now on January 8th 
did you feel you were getting a preference T 
A. I certainly did not, sir. . . 
Q. Did yon feel that Mrs. Smith at that time was insolventt 
. A. Yes, sir; I did. I felt .~he was in a pretty bad circum-
stance, but insolvency, I cannot say. That term designates 
a person, I believe, to be hopelessly and consciously hopelessly 
unable and unwilling, almost, to pay their obligations. ·But· 
this woman firmly stood on the gro.und that she was going to 
see me paid, and everyone else, every one of her creditors, 
because she was ambitious, hardworking and .intended to stay 
in business, and assured me I would get every cent from her 
that was coming to me. 
Q. Do not understand that the Court is criticizing you in 
the acceptance of this amount. I wanted to ascertain whether 
or not, with your information about Mrs. Smith, the diligence 
with which you were prosecuting your claimt whether you felt 
that she was insolvent, and accepting money from her beyond 
that which other creditors in the same class might receive. 
Did you feel that? 
A. I certainly did not, because I knew other creditors were 
getting money from her, pushing her and holding 
page 31 r their hands out right at her cash register every 
day, but I must add, sir, for my own .good and well-
42 Supreme C'cmrt of Appealc;r of Virginia 
Mitchell. Cohen. 
'being that I knew that she was. i11.solve11.n, or ratheir hard 
pressed, but I was doing no more than other credit0rs were-
doingi and no more than the Arlington Amusement Company 
themselves were doing. · ·. . 
Q. Was the Arlington Amusement Compa:ny doing any-
thing more tha:m. you were doing t · 
A .. I 4oubt it.. They were looking out for themselves,. and! 
so was I. 
Qec Everybody wast· 
A .. Yesa. sir. 
By Mr. Rudd: {Continued} . 
~Q. l\fr. Cohen, when you had your :first conversation with 
Mr. Wood about this matter after Mrs. Smith had sent you 
down there, what impression did he give you as to the state, 
Qf Mrs. Smith 1s financial affairst · 
The Court : I will not permit that qu~stion to be answe-red .. 
. He can say what Mr. Wood said •. 
Q. What did he say in regard to her financial affairs t 
A. I must admit I cannot recall at all what he said, but-
The Court: Then yon cannot answer that question. 
Mr. Rudd: If Your Honor please, I intended to ask him 
the general line of his information that Mr. Wood gave Mi·. 
Cohen. 
page 32 f The Court : He has already said that, I think .. 
. In other words, the Cou.rt is not permitting him to 
say what impression Mr. Wood's statement made on his mind .. 
It might have made an entirely different impression and 
might have meant something entirely clifferent to somebo-dy 
eJse'·s mind, or upon my mind. 
CROSS EXAMINATION .. 
By Mr. Poindexter: 
Q. Mr. Cohen, you say that you represented Siegel~s Mar-
ket, or Siegel Brothers. What did that account cover, what 
f orrn of purchases f · 
A. Merchandise purchased and furnished to her. 
Q. Was it furnished to lier as operator of Squire GriII or 
Rainbow Grill f -
A. Squire Grill, and a small portion to the Rainbow Grill .. 
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. Q. You knew she was operating two restaurants! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How much had MrEt. Smith been behind to you at any one· 
time, to Siegel Brothers, I believe? 
A. Your question is: How much was she behind to me 7 
Q. In arrears to Siegel Brothers at any one time. Do you 
- know that? 
page 33 ~ A. I can only tell you that she owed them in ex-
cess of a thousand dollars. 
Q. At the time it was turned over to. your for collection, 
A. That's right, sir. 
Q. You are not familiar with what her account had been in 
the past? · 
A. No, f3ir. 
Q. S6 it may have been more than that in the past and may 
have all been paid up f 
A. I really don't know. I can't even discuss that point. 
_Q. When was the claim turned over to you 'by Siegel 
Brothers for collection? f 
A. I ehould be able to tell you that quickly, bee-l!use I had 
my :file in my hands yesterday, but I didn 7t look. :But I 8.P1 
pretty sm'e that it was in November or December; in fact, 
I can be quite ~ertain that it waa EU'Qund that time. 
Q. Sometime before Christmas? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And she had made some payments to you Y 
A. She had, around three hundred dollars. 
Q. The last date of payment you eaid was what? 
A. December 8th I did notice she gave me fifty dollars. 
Q. I believe in your testimony a minute ago you aaid Jann-
ary 8th. 
A. January 8th, · .I am sorry1 I meant January 
page 34 ~ 8th. That is the correct date. . 
. Q. Then you went to see her and discussed it 
with her later! 
A. Several times. 
Q. How often did she ·make these· payuienta · to you? · · 
A. It approximately amQunted to th~ :firat month a hundred 
dollars. · 
Q. I mean if she paid you~ made a payment to you the .first 
of the month, when did you ~,cpect another payment?° 
A~ Th~ next week. 
Q. So that she paid. y.ou on January 8th and th~n you ex-
pected another payment J anua.ry 15th Y 
44 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Mitchell Cohen. 
A. That is right, sir. 
Q. ·Then you went and discussed it with her at that timef 
A. Now, I cannot be too sure about the dates as to when 
I went to see her. 
Q .. Ordinarily gave her a few days leeway? 
A. I certainly did. 
Q. 1Vben you discussed the matter with her, what did she 
tell you Y 
A. At what point? 
Q. After she had failed to pay you and make any more pay-
ments and you went to see her, what did she say to you about 
her condition? · 
page 35 ~ A. I am pretty sure she told me I was _to look 
to Mr. Wood. We spoke of Mr. Wood personally, 
not as. the concern he represented, that I was to look to him,. 
because-
Q. Did she say-
Mr. Rudd: Let him finish. 
A. Because a purchaser had been found and that he would 
have money which it had been agreed between them was to 
belong to her and which he was to use to pay off her creditors, 
and that I need not worry, she was going tQ see I was paid, 
and I believe she meant it. 
Q. Did she say how much money that was~ 
A. She did, but I cannot tell you now. She told me, but-
Q. You can't say exactly l!ow much it was T 
• A. No., I cannot. But subsequent conversations with Mr. 
_Wood revealed to me the fact that I would never get all that 
my claim was. · · 
Q. Did· that conversation with Mr. Wood reveal that to 
you the first time you talked with Mr. Wood T 
.A. No, sir; I don't helieye so. I am not too sure about . 
that. · 
Q. So after January 8th, the time of the first payment, you 
gave her~ week or more to dismuss it, then after discussing 
it with Mrs. Smith, you made one call on Mr. Wood and dis-
cussed it wit4 him, and then at a later time you 
page 36 ~ made another call on Mr. Wood? . · 
. . A. I saw Mr. Wood two or three times, but not 
many more times, I don't believe. But I am pretty sure two 
or three times. And yvith each visit I gradually lost hope of 
getting a great deal of money out of -the funds which he held 
for her to be distributed to her creditors. 
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RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
:By Mr .. Rudd: · 
Q. Mr. Cohen, in light of subsequent developments, is there 
any doubt in your mind that 'Mrs. Smith was actually insol-
vent at the time she s~t you ta Mr. Wood! 
Mr. Poindexter: I object., 'because subsBquent events are 
irrelevant. 
The Court: What is that question again! 
Mr. Rudd: I think that question is pertinent,, if Your Honor 
p~~ . -
The Court : The hind sight of all of us is, ever so much 
better than the ·foresight, or our preview of things. There-
fore you can't judge people's acts by what they: might after-
wards find out. 
· Mr. Rudd: Here the issue. that I want to correct that ques-
tion to is.,-N ot the knowledge on the part of ·the Arlin.gton 
Amusement Corporation, but the actual situation .at · that 
- time, and on .that point the question is certainly ad-
page 37 } missible and relevant. . , , 
· The Court: The 'question as to what was his 
opinion now as to what her condition was then, I think should 
be brought out from· the statement of facts and should -not be 
what his state of mind is. The Court is not concerned with 
his state of mind. 
Mr. Rudd: If Your Honor please, the purpose of the ques-
tion was simply to ask him if he didn't, or in the light of sub-
sequent developments if he isn't certain now at that time she 
was insolvent. Since that is an issue before the Court I think 
it is proper. 
The Court: I think the subsequent developments are mat-
ters for the Court to determi:µe, matters to be -introduced be-
fore the Court, if they determine what might have been the 
condition on January 10th rather than whl\t impression those 
icertain things made upon the witness' mind. 
Mr. Rudd: May we have an exception for the record? 
The Court: Yes. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Poindexter: 
· page 38 ~ Q. Mr. Cohen, at the time you discussed the mat-
ter with Mr. W o«;>d, you say it was the second or 
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Ji itchelt C QJH~n .. 
third time yo-u we:re the,e, was there flnY discussion .... of 
whether ·Mrs. Smith was going into partnership-. with some-
one and would improve her financial standing,. do you recall 
tha.t! . 
A.- (Pa1;1se) YQur que.stio11-. . 
Q. Didn't you tall Mr. Wood that you discussed it with 
Mrs. Smith and she said that she had a partner?. 
A, That i~f more correct, your first question didn't say that .. 
That is more correct, sir~. That is. definitely correct .. 
Q. A~d her representation was that she was- a.ble to take 
care of all obligations of that transacti~n! 
A. She always assured me she was going to see that I was 
paid! I treated her fairly~ and although~ 
Q. You yourself didn't know of any actual inte:rest that 
Mr&. Smith may have had in the equipment Y · 
A. Yes, I knew she did not own them. 
Q. Did not own them t 
A. Y~s, sir.. . g:· Did yo-u know anything about what she ownecl at Rain~ 
bow Grilli · · 
A. Yes, sir., · 
Q" What waa the situation there t · 
A. I learned through my acquaintanc.e with 
page 39 } r~staurant people and in convaraation with her, 
- which she unhesitatingly revealed to me, that there 
was a party interested in her and who bad advanced her a· 
. large sum of m.oney for which sbe gave back to him a mort-
gage on the building and the aquipm~nt. _ 
- Q, This information came to you after thiEJ transaction 
too:k place, after the last payment Y 
A. No, sir . 
. Qj> You knew about this before Christmas f 
A. I believe that I did, because I gaimid Mrs. Smith's con~ 
fidence, and Mr$, Smith had my confidenc.e, becaUf~e I assured 
he.r that I would like to see b~r $tay in bu~i:ness and pay my 
claim, in view of that revelation. · · 
Now I am telling you these thinga beqause I believe them 
to be the most nearly correct recollection that I liave of the 
situation. 
Witness stood aside. 
Mr. Rudd: That is the case . 
. The Court: Any further evidenGe f 
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· Mr. Poindexter: If Your Honor please, I would like to 
make a motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence in tl1is case 
for the reason he hasn't sustained the burden of 
page 40 ~ proof in showing that property belonging to Mrs. 
. Smith was transferred to the defendant, in the 
first place, and in the second place he hasn't shown that the 
defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupt 
was insolvent at the time the transfer was made_, alleged 
transfer was made. 
The Court: That motion will be considered, because it in-
volves most of the points I understood are involved in the 
case, about which I understand counsel desire to make a more 
elaborate argument. So that for the moment it would be 
overruled. It can be ;renewed at the close of the argument. 
HAROLD E. WOOD, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the defendant, first being 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Poindexter: 
Q. Give your name and add~ess. 
A. Harold E. Wood; Richmond, Vitginia. 
page 41 ~ Q .. What is your connection with the Arlington 
.Amusem~nt Corporation Y 
A. I am Secretary and Traasurer of .Arlington Amusement 
Corporation. 
Q. When did you first enter into a· contract of lease with 
Mrs. SmithY · 
A. It. was, I believe, January, 1943. 
Mr. Poindexter I l would like to introduce in evidence this 
original, January 20, 1943, with right to substitute a copy,, 
marked Exhibit ~Defendant. 
Notte: At this time this paper writing is tnarked and filed 
as Exhibit 5-Def endant, 
Q. ln that original lease, wa~ there a provision to set up 
some securities to take care of any delinquent rents that 
might J)CCUr f 
A. Yest sir, 
Q. What was the original understanding about thatY 
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. 
A. The original understanding was that she was to put up· 
. a deposit of one thousand dollars against rent. 
Q. Was that ever done! 
A. She originally said she had a partner who was going 
into the restaurant with her, and that he was going to put up 
the thousand dollars, which he did. She afterwards said that 
· the partner decided not to go into the partnership 
page. 42 ~ with her and asked tlmt we. release the thousand 
dollars in order that she could return it to him. 
Q. Did yon agree to do tba t Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did Mrs. Smith make any money in the business, was 
that one of the reasons why? 
A. Yes, she was apparently doing very well. 
Q. Did she have any other interest in the equipment and 
furnishings that were. in the buildings, own any of that? 
A. No interest whatever in the furnishings or equipment. 
Q. What were the negotiations leacling up to the agreement 
that was entered into on January 10, 1945, at which time the 
business was sold T Will you give the history of that? 
A. Mrs. Smith stated that she had a prospective pur-
chaser-
Mr. Rudd: If Your Honor please, I want to allow counsel 
all the latitude possible, but I just fail to see how negotiations 
leading up to the agreement can ·affect the situation. It seems 
to me that the negotiations having culminated in an agree-
ment., the agreement being a part of the record in this case, 
the agreement would necessarily speak for itself. 
Mr. Poindexter: If Your Honor please, I would like to 
say that one of the points under consideration here is the 
agreement dated January 10, 1945, which was en-
page 43 ~ tered into by Arling'ton Am~sement Corporation 
and Dolly Smith, and it is important as to the 
meaning of that agreement. We are not trying by this testi-
mony to change the agreement~ but merely trying to show 
wl1at it means. That is the purpose. 
Mr. Rudd: If Your Honor please-
The Court: I think so .far as the agreement is concerned 
that it is not one phrased in doubtful meaning. I think it is 
perfectly clear. Therefore its construction is to be had by 
the Court. The Court took it when you asked the question 
that you were leading up to circumstances ·which would in-
dicate whether or not his information at the time of the agree-
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meilt was sueb. as to cause him to believe -or not to ,believe.that 
it was the intention ·of Mrs. Smith to give. him any pref er-
,ence, as to whether or not he had rea,son tq believe she was 
insolvent. I will permit you to .ask questions related to those 
phases of the matter, but as to what his interpretation of this 
agreement is, I think that i.s for the Oourt. . -
1\1:r. Poindexter: The principal purpose of tbat particular 
question was to see and determine what interest if any, or 
what property Mrs. Smith may have had in the busines~ 
The Court: I think yon can ask that question 
page 44 ~ with011t going into the history or· without seeking 
an interpretation of the contract. .. Yon-can ask 
him what property interest she had in the subject riiat~er of 
the sale. 
By Mr. Poindexter: (Continued) . 
'Q. Did Mrs. Smith have any interest in the .equipment, 
furniture and fixtures, which are set forth in the Bill of Sale 
nled as Exhibit 2-PlaintiffT · · -
A. She had no interest in the equipment, only her food in-
ventory. . 
Q. What were your feelings in regard to the financial-statu~ 
of Mrs. Smith at that time! 
A. Well, we thought she. was all right,, had no reason to 
think she was not~ She had stated that she was doing well 
not only at the Squire Grill but at the Rainbow Grill which 
she was operating, and she was making money. 
Q. Had she ever been delinquent in her rents before 1 
·A. She was two and a half months delinquent at that time, 
-rather she was delinquent for November and December 
N~ . 
Q. I mean, had she before this time ever. run ~ver a pe-
riod-
A. She had paid her rents satisfactorily up to the late 
summer or early fall of 1944, when she began being late. on 
her payments. 
page 45 } Q. In other wo~ds, sometimes she would be late, 
but she would pay it upY 
A. Sometimes she would be late, but she would pay it up 
satisfactorily after asking for a payment. 
Q. When did Mrs. Smith purchase the Rainbow Grill Y 
A. That I do not lmQw. I just do not recaU. 
Q. Approximately! 
so foupteme <Jottl't or App.eaISl of' -V.irg"m.tt¥. 
H rn-iirl E. W&tJ .. 
A.: }fy rec~llectio:n is it was in the late- stlnttI1e.r ow early 
fall of 1944... The best of my ·recollection,. 
The c~ulit. r Where is the Ra1nbow Gllili t 
:Mr. Poindexter: What.is now known as T.erry 1S' Grill on 
the 3200 Block of West :Broad Street.. A.oross f:rom the 
Chicken. in t.hi Rwgh! •. . . · _ . . . . .. 
~he Ooiittz -~his plaee soJ.d vr.as .~G.t .. the RminJ)~ Grillf 
Mr ... Ruid,~~ '!'hat was the· Squire· Grill o:a North 6th Stre·et ... 
Q. Did yotl knthv whether she had purchased that pioperty. 
or ilt>t'f 
.A.. :t did not defuiitely know. I had understood that she 
hacl. . . 
Q. Had an interest in ii Y 
.A.r I understood she ford pur~na~ed it herself~ 
Q. And it was only after s·h~ had go11~ into this other busi-
ness that she ran_ over a l~iJ.g time with her rent to -you t 
.A.., That's :rig-ht. . . . 
page 46 } Q. W ;;ts entering tnto this conttaet Wliereby you: 
tesetved y-oor rent before making ttny payment to 
Mrs. Srµi:fu a new idea with yoll, was it_ some~hing that just 
occlii'tetl td you that sh~ was insolvent and thereiore you would 
expect to protect y~mrself 7 
A. _No,. had . We hnd any suspicion she -r~s. insoiy~nt . we 
would tteve1· :hav~ mad~ anY. such ttontract with _lier. We were just giving her the tntlney in excess of what she owed to us .. 
Mt. Rudd: i objetlt to tlia't. I belie~ that is the very poi.nt 
the Court has said wM fo1· the dflttrt to construe. 
By the Court: .. 
Q. WJiat property interest did Mrs. Smith have ta seIH 
A .. None. 
Q. Under this contract you. did~ 't ~e~l ~he S11pplies that-
were o_fi ha~d, that were owned hr this- lady °l 
A- No, sir. 
Q, ~h~ retained ~ose f 
A- Yes, sir.. . . 
. Q .. What was_it tl;iat,,~pe·sold under. this co~t~act for which 
she was entitled to $2,500.001 ev_en cash or credit? 
A. ShJ had nothing to sell, the rest we gave_ ~e~ _the credit 
of the drtrerehce _pet~e~n what sh owed 11s and $2,50Q.OO was 
that she had told us she had a prospective pur-
page 47 } chaser for the equipment, and we told her to bring 
· them in and we would tak with them .. She said she 
J. vVell:ford Smith, Trustee, v. Arlington Amus. Corp. 51 
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. could sell them £or $8,000.00. She made an appointment to 
bring her prospective purchaser to see Mr. Thalbimer and 
me at Mr. Thalhimer 's office. They didn't show up. In the 
meanwhile Mr. Foster, Lighthouse Grill on 7th Streett called 
rue up and told me he understood that the Squire Grill was 
for sale. I told him that we would entertain any offer that 
'he might have, but in the meanwhile Mrs. Smith had told us 
that she was bringing a person down there, but they did not 
show up. So I went by to see Mr. Foster, and quoted him a 
price of $10,000.00 for the equipment in- the event Mrs. Smith 
could not bring her purchaser in. 
So he said well, he and his brother would come down to see 
us at 11 o'clock the fallowing morning. I got in touch with 
Mrs. Smith and told her. that we had this prospMtive pur. 
chaser, and we would give her the preference as she had al-
ready committed hetself to. these other people. So we told 
her we would give her until 11 o'clock to bring· her purchaser 
down~ They hadn't shown up, the Foster boys did, so we be-
gun negotiating with them and the result was that we sold 
it to them for $8,500.00 in cash. In the m~anwhile Mr. Thal-
himer had told Mrs. Smith that if she could--
Mr. Rudel: Ir Your Honor ·please, I fail to see how all of 
this conversation is .relevant, particularly how this conversa-
tion-
page 48 ~ The Court: The Court is trying to find out why 
Mrs. Smith got $2,500.00, or was agreed to be paid 
either in cash or creel.it the sum of $2,500.00 in this contract. 
Mr. Rudd: For the record I should like to state that our 
position is that the agreement introduced.in evidence between 
the defendant and Mrs. Smith is evidence on that point, and 
should speak for itself. · 
. The Court: If counsel desires to abide by the agrMment, 
that is one thing. If it seeks to vitiate the agreem~nt, it is 
another thing·. If counsel seeks to take advantage of one part 
o~ the agreement, which is to his advantage, and discards 
the other parts of the agreement to his disadvantage, that if; 
still a third thing. 
Now a preference arises when one creditor is paid more 
than his share in a transaction in which the estate of thP 
bankrupt is diminished. I am undertaking to find out whether 
or not in this entire transaction the state of the b,ankrupt 
has been diminished, or increa.sed1 or what it was, and there-
fore I am trying to :find out why this $2,500.00 was paid to 
· her, or. allowed to her. So you may proceed, Mr. Poin~exter. 
52 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Ha.rold E. Wood. 
By Mr. Poindexter : (Continued) . 
page 49 r Q. Under Mrs. Smith's original lease we gave 
her an option at any time to purcb&se the equip- . 
ment at a price to be agreed upon. When Mrs. Smith told us 
she had a prospective purchaser, she said. for $8,000.00, Mr . 
. Thalhimer then told her that if she would sell it, sell the 
eqµipment for $8,000.00 in cash he would give her a credit of 
$2,000.00 above ·what she owed to us at that time. 
Well, she didn't get her purchaser, and after we made the 
agreement with the Foster boys Mr. Thalhimer called Mrs. 
Smith in and asked her to enter into the ag-reement-tp sell to 
them. She asked about the credit which she was to get, she 
still maintained she could sell to her purchaser if she be given 
a little more time. 
So Mr. Thalhimer agreed that he would go ahead and give 
her the two thousand. dollars credit. She said, well, we were 
getting $8,500; why couldn't she ·have the extra five hundred 
dollars as that would pay out everything she owed including 
what she owed to Arlington Amusement Corporation .. Mr. 
Thalhimer out of the goodness of his heart just told her that 
he would give her the twenty-five hundred dollars credit if 
that would pay her out, and that she could go up to the Rain-
bow Grill and operate that without any debts hanging on 
her. He said our association with her had been very pleas-
ant over a period of two years, and that he wanted to see her 
do well at the Rainbow Grill. 
He agreed to give her the excess of what she 
page 50 ~ owed ns to apply to it to discharge her bills. 
By the Court : . 
Q. Then ~s I understand it, what she had in the property 
was an ,option to buy Y 
A. Option to purchase it at a price to be agreed upon. 
Q. Was that in your lease Y · 
A. That was in the original lease. 
Mr. Poindexter: Item 22. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rudd: 
Q.: Mr. Wood, Mrs. Smith then did have this option in the 
lease7 
A. She had the option in the original lease. 
Q. .And as I u~derstand your testimony you all gave her . 
J. We11iord Smith, Trustee, v. Arlin.goon Anius. Corp. SS 
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this. twenty-five hundred dollars in paym~nt :for that ~terest 
she had, is that correct? 
.A. No, sir. The reason he gave her the twenty-five hlin-
idred dollars as stated was .she insisted that she had the pros-
pective purchaser who would pay .$8,000.00 cash for the equip-
ment, but that she had been unable to get them down to our 
office to close the deal. When the Foster boys entered into 
the picture, they wanted to do business immediately. When 
we got them down there, when they made an appointment to 
see us at 11 o'clock, they were there. We had pre-
page 51 } viously notified Mrs. Smith if she did not get her 
purchaser there that we were going to deal with 
the Foster boys. -
Q. I didn't mean for you to enter into a long -explanation 
. :again, but I understood the last question that the Court asked 
you was as to whether or not she didn't own that option, and 
whether or not if she wasn't selling that option by this agree-
mentT 
. A. She had not exercised the option. She had not exer-
-cised the option. 
Q. She· owned the license, business license to that business 
also, did she not, Mr. Wood? -
A. I believe so. 
· Q. That was·;worth something, wa& it not 7 
A. I would assume that it was. 
Q. I didn't hear you. 
A. I would assume it was worth something to the operator 
of the business. 
Q. And when the business was sold she sold that, did she 
not? .. 
.A. I believe not. Don't know whether slie sold any license. 
Don't even know she had taken out a license for that vear. 
I am practically certain that the Foster boys did not .. take 
over her license. I am not positive, but I do not believe they 
took over her license. 
Q. She had a going business, did she not, Mr. 
page 52} Wood? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was not that worth something Y 
A. I would say it was to an operator. 
Q. Isn't it a fact-
Mr. Poindexter: If Your Honor ·please, I object to this line 
of questioning because it has been exhibited here what the 
Sf Supreme C'ourt of' Appeals o.f Vfrginh1 
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.I 
bill of sale co:risisted of, a1td didn't contain either one: of thes~ 
things .. 
The Court: I take it Mr .. Rudd is trying to elucidate anc1 
enlarge upon the information that the Court sought. 
Mr. Rudd: If Your Honor please, the position--
The- Court: . You may proceed, Mr .. Rudd. 
Mr. ;Rudd: The position of the plaintiff is that the agree-
ment spealt's entirely for itself, but the Court having indi-
cated :that it desired elucidation by further information I was 
tryiug: to:bring that out. 
i 
Q, Isn't it a fact, Mr, Wood, that a great deal more can 
always be obtained for a business such as this if a:t the-time of 
the sale it" is a going business than if not t 
page 53 ~ A. I would say so. . 
Q .. Mrs. Smith was t}Je owner of· the goodwill of 
that business as a going business, was she not, at the time of 
the saleY 
A. I would say she was the owner of what good will there 
might be .. 
Q. And by entering into this agreement of sale to the Fos-
ter brothers, she sold that good will to thelll; did she not Y 
A. I would say no. 
Q. You have just said she had a going business and that 
g·ood will in a going business was worth a great deal. 
A. Generally speaking I would say yes. If, I . said. I 
qualified that statement by saying if there :was a good will. 
Q.. The Foster brothers entered right into tltat business 
and continued it as a restaurant bttsinessf 
A. No, sir. They closed up and made alterations and 
changes, and they said that they could not operate it as it had 
been operating, that they were going t6 make an entire change 
in the operntion-
Q. They have subsequently opened it np as a. restaurant 
business? 
,4.. Yest sir. 
Q. After some alterations f 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Of the interior f 
A. That is correct .. 
Q. Mr. Wood, you know, did yon not, that Mrs .. 
page 54 ~ Smith was heavily involved in reference to the 
Rainbow Grill¥ · 
.A~ I did not know. Didn't know. 
Q. Didn't you know that the Deed of Trust, which was on 
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record in the Chancery C.ourt of the City of Richmond, that 
has been referred to by Mr. Cohen-
4. On January 10th t I did not. 
Q. You knew however· she was two and a half months be-
hind in her rent at the timet 
A. I knew that. . 
Q. You knew that the Richmond Newspapers had a judg 
ment against her of almost five hundred dollars, did you not Y 
A. Not at the time we made the agreement with her; 
Q. You knew that on the 17th of January, did you not t 
A. I knew it on the 17th of January. 
Q. And in fact you had been garnisheed on that judgment. 
bad you notY 
A. We had. 
Q. Didn't that suggest to you that she might be insolvenU 
A. That one fact would not. The subsequent developments 
did sug~est it to me that she might be,. subsequent develop-
ments did~ · 
1.\fr. Rudd: May I see the garnishee record t (Looking at 
record.) 
Q. You say, Mr. Wood, that subsequent developments have 
shown you she was insolvent Y 
page 55 ~ A. That is correct. 
Q. When, just when did those developments oc-
cur? . 
A. I don't recall the exact date; but at the time I received 
this g·arnishee summons I called Mrs. Smith on the telephone 
and, told her .about it, and she stated that was one of the bills 
she said the twenty-five hundred dollars would take care of. 
Q~ And a short while after that--
A. A short while after that I begun receiving othet bills in 
large aniounts that she had i:nstructed people that I woul<l 
pay, so I called up Mrs. Smith and told her that people had 
presented bills in excess of $4,000.00 to :tne with the instruc-
tions that I was to pay them; and I asked her why· she gave 
them those instructions. She made the statement that she 
was negotiating and had a prospective partner who would 
enter with her in the Rainbow Grill and was going to put_ up 
$10,000.00 in cash, and every one of these bills would be paid 
in full. That she was just waiting for that. Irt the mean-
while she wanted all the bills to come to me at one place, and 
that she would turn the money over to tne, the difference. 
enough to take care of all o:fi those bills after this partner put 
up the $10,000.00 in cash. I told her, ''Mrs. Smith, I cannot 
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do your bookkeeping for you, all I want you to do is to carry 
.out our agreement". 
Q. Can you tell the Court when it was that you 
page 56 ~ first got possession of sufficient facts to put you 
. on notice that she was or might be insolvent Y 
.A. I couldn't state tl1e exact da.tP. 
Q. Can you tell the Court when it was that you knew that 
the amount of the claims or debts against her were more than 
the funds, this $2,500.00 in your hands, with which to pay 
them? · 
A. I would say that it was about a week after t11e original 
agreement. 
Q. A week after the 10th of January f 
A. I would say about that time. 
Q. Which would make it about the 17th of January~ 
A. Well, it might have been the 17th, might have been the 
16th, I don't know. I wouldn't say. 
Q. It was along in there you·knew she was insolvent? 
A. I didn't know it. 
Q. You bad reasonable cause to believe she wasf 
A. I had reason to believe, but in the meanwhile she had 
assured me that all of these bills would be paid, that she was 
taking in a partner in the Rainbow Grill who was going- to 
put up the cash, that she would send me money to pay all of 
these bills in full. 
By the Court: 
Q. Mr. Wood, the question asked last by Mr. Rudd was when 
you knew that money in your hands derived from 
page 57 ~ the sale of this Squire Restaurant allotted to Mrs. 
Smith would not be snf ficient to pay all of lier 
creditors, I would like to enlarge on that question by asking 
you: - When did yon find out that that :qioney together with 
other property that she had would be insufficient to pay her 
debts! 
A .. I never did find that out definitely. I didn't know what 
interest she had jn the Rainbow Grill, and I still don '.t know 
what other property she had. · 
Q. When did you then have reasonable ca use to believe she 
was insolvent Y Insolvency means when a person's assets are 
not sufficient to pay their Jiabilities. 
A. I don't know that I can say when I had reason to be-
lieve that she was insolvent. I will say that when I first knew 
that she had bills in excP-ss of the amount that was due her 
from Arlington Amusement Company, that was the first date 
.J. Wellford Smith, "Trustee, v. Arling:ton Amus. Corp. Si 
when Mr. Mitchell Cohen came in and· presented the bill of 
Siegel's Market, and one· other b.i.H, Hastings, I believe.. 
Q. Can you say when tbat was f Mr .. Cohen was rather in .. 
definite. 
A. I am not positive 1ts to the date, but I would say that 
:it was within a week after the·original agreement was made. 
I would say it was within a week ""hen he first visited me. 
Q. Did you know at that time after Mr. Cohen had been in, 
did you have reason to believe that she was insolvent f 
· A.. No, sir. 
;page 58 } Q. Did · you have any other information that 
w-0uid put y-0u on notice? 
·A. No, sir. 
Q. Make you suspect that she was inS'OlventT 
A. I had no -other information. , 
Q. Did you know at that time slie owned the Rainbow Grill? 
A. I had heard that. Did not know. I knew she· was op-
ierating· it, and what she had told ma 
Q. Did you know what other assets she had besides the 
money your firm was allowing for her? 
A. No, sir; knew notbing·-abont that. Knew nothing of her 
outside interests. 
Witness stood aside. 
The Court : Any other witnesses? 
Mr. Rudd: That is the case. . 
Mr. Poindexter: I again renew my motion, if Your Honor 
please. . 
The Court: I will hear all argument at the same time, after 
the evidence is concluded. 
page 59 } Mr. Rudd: If Your Honor please-
The Court: I think probably we would all be 
more comfortable and can hear better back in my office on 
account of the Courtroom being hard to he.ar in. 
Note: After argument in Chambers the case was taken un-
der consideration. · 
Hearing concluded. 
page 60 } And be it further remembered, and the Court 
doth hereby certify, that the exhibits mentioned in 
said transcript and the conclusions of the Court mentioned in 
said order entered herein on August 14, 1945, are marked as 
indicated in said transcript and order and were filed with the 
evidenc·e taken in the cause and were a part of the evidence 
before t~e Court on which its judgment was based and have 
S& Supreme C'onrt of Appeal's of' Y:frgfuiai 
been and hereby are made a part of the record. to be trans-
mitted to the Supreme Court of Appeals for use in the hear-
ing ori appeal, if a writ of enor shall be; granted heteirr, with 
the same effect. as they were used in this Court, instead of bea. 
ing copied into flie record.. . 
And be it further remembered thRt the plaintiff, be!ore the-
order and judgment of August 14, 1945; was entered herein,. 
objected to the same and excepted thereto· upon its. entry be-
cause of the rejection by said order of the claim <1f the plain-
tiff that the. payment of the sum of Thfr.teeii Hundred Forty-
thrbe~ Dollars and ninety~two cettts ($1,343.92.) to the defend-
ant on or about the 17th day of Ja:nttary, 1945, constituted a 
voidqble. preference within the purview of the Ba:likruptcy 
Act and· for the ftirther reason, also, that .the order of Au-
gust 14, 1945, was based upon evidence not properly admis-
sible ag shown by the transcript of the recoro. 
And the Court further certifies that this certificate- of ex-
ceptions of' the plaintiff was tendered to it after reasonable 
notice in writing of the time and place the-reof to defe:hda11t's-
counsel, as required by law, praying the same niiglit 
page 61 f be signed and sealed attd made a part o{ the rec~ 
ord, which is accordingly done this 17th day bf 
.August, 1945,. and within the time required by law. 
HASKINS HOBSON, 
Judge of the Law and_Eqnity Oourt of the 
City of Richmond, Part II. 
page 62 f I, Luther Libby, Jr., Clerk of the Law and Equity 
Court of the . City of Richmond, Pa:rt Two; do 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a tr1;1e transcript of the 
record in the cause wherein. J. Wellford Smith, Trustee in 
Bankruptcr. for. Dolly C. Smith, also kn~ a~ Mrs. Mike A .. 
$mith, fo.chvidually and t/a Rainbow Grill and also as SquirP 
Grill, is plaintiff and Arlington Amusement Corporation, a 
Virginia corporation, defendant, with the exception of th(> 
original exhibits filed in evidence and that the attorney of 
record for the defendant had due notice of the intention di" 
the plaintiff to apply for such transcript. 
Witness my hand this 7th day of September, 1945. 
LUTHER LIBBY. JR., 
Clerk; µaw and Equity Court of the 
· City of Ricl:imond, Part Two. 
Fee for Record $16.25. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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